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I. BACKGROUND:

Introduction
The decision-making processes of the legislature and
judiciary are more easily understood, and usually more visible to the
public, than those of the scores of regulatory agencies whose
critical decisions impact our daily lives. The Public Utilities
Commission (PUC), for example, has a tremendous workload and agenda
which annually involves thousands of decisions impacting not only
transportation and water utilities, but the critical concerns
involving the cost and quality of telephone, gas and electric service
to all Californians. With the large number of significant
proceedings handled by this commission, and the recent commission
decisions made to abandon traditional ways of regulating utilities
and instead promote "deregulation," the manner in which the PUC
conducts business has become a controversial issue.

How PUC decisions are made, and the fairness of the process,
has been an ongoing issue at the PUC for many years. Depending upon
the make-up of the commission and the decisions made, various
interests have either thought the process has worked well--or has
been in need of
overhaul
procedural guidel
Recent Senate actions to address some of these concerns
included bills
Senator Rosenthal to require ex parte disclosure
rules, and to better separate the roles of Administrative Law Judges
(ALJ 1 s) and the PUC commissioners. Last session, Senator Roberti
undertook a comprehensive process of investigating complaints about
the PUC process using Preprint SB 8 as a vehicle for discussion.
Based on the Preprint SB 8 review, this year Senator Roberti
introduced SB 1042 to respond to concerns about internal PUC
procedures, and SB 1041 to reform the process for judicial review of
PUC decisions.
Inside the commission, debate has continued concerning
procedural reforms. For example, several attempts have been made
the past to establish general ex parte rules, only to fail. Last
month the PUC once again issued "proposed" rules which would
regulate the review of ex parte communications--this proposal rel
on a system of public disclosure.
Make-up of PUC

Originally established in 1911 as
Railroad Commission,
the PUC
authori
by the state constitution to regulate
utilities. The Governor appoints
the Senate approves the five
commissioners who serve staggered six-year terms.
Commissioners approve all regulatory dec ions by a major
vote, usually after a lengthy process which involves both
quasi-legislat
/judicial responsibilities. The PUC code requires
the commission to determine how utility service can best be delivered
in a safe and reliable manner and what amount is appropriate for
ratepayers to pay for the service. The commissioners must also
determine a fair rate of return for the utilities and their
stockholders.
In the past, the most important proceedings at the PUC have been
traditional rate cases--when utilities request a change in the rates
they charge or the services they provide. But most of this has
changed since this commission dramatically altered utility regulation
to favor market based decisions. Recently, the PUC has initiated
own investigatory proceedings as an intial step to significant
restructuring of the
lity industry.

PUC Process
The process of determining the outcome of investigations or
changes requested by utilities results in the "hearing process",
which generally includes the following steps:
-2-

o a prehearing conference may be held to identify the
parties involved and the major issues which need to be addressed;
o an assigned Commissioner, as well as an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ), are selected to preside over the actual hearing where
the parties, their lawyers, economists and other expert witnesses
present testimony. Testimony is either given in support of the
utility's request or against it. Written legal briefs are also
presented and reviewed by the ALJ;
o the ALJ, upon completion of the hearing, issues a draft
decision which is usually reviewed and approved by the assigned
commissioner which is circulated for comments among the parties;
o after review of the comments, the commissioner assigned to
the specific case, issues a decision which is presented to the full
commission for approval.
o the commissioners vote on the decision; dissatisfied
parties can petition for a modification of the decision;
o the last avenue for critics of the commission's final
decision is to request that the state Supreme Court (the only
appellate court allowed to review PUC decisions) reverse the PUC
action. The Supreme Court rarely agrees to such review requests.

II. CONCERNS RAISED ABOUT PUC PROCESS
Increasingly, concerns have been raised at legislative hearings
and in other forums about maintaining a fair PUC process. It is
obviously very difficult for a party to various PUC proceedings to
criticize the commission which regulates it. However, as the speed
and scope of several recent PUC proceedings have pitted various
distinct competitive groups against each other, and as this
commission has moved in regulatory directions that some contend favor
the general deregulatory goals of large utility interests, criticisms
about the process have surfaced. Among the concerns raised about PUC
process are:
Appellate court Review -- Some have complained that because the
decisions made by the PUC can only be reviewed by the California
Supreme Court, which rarely accepts review of PUC cases, there is
in actuality no effective judicial accountability of PUC decisions.
Few statutory changes have been made since the Supreme Court was
first established as the sole reviewer of commission decisions.

When the Supreme Court does grant a petition for review of a PUC
decision, it will receive a record, hear arguments and render an
opinion with an explanation of its reasoning. However, judicial
review of PUC decisions is an exceptional event, as noted in a 1988
article published in the Hasting Law Journal:
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In some ninety percent of the cases
coming up from the CPUC, however, the
court denies the petition for a writ
of review. In such cases, the court
does not have the record before it,
does not hear oral argument, and
issues its denial without opinion or
explanation.
Even in cases where the Supreme Court has agreed to review a PUC
decision, some have argued that the statutory standard of judicial
review is so narrow, that fair and just decisions are not always
forthcoming.
A variety of divergent parties have promoted the establishment of
an additional lower appellate court review, where PUC decisions are
more likely to be considered. These parties believe that the greater
likelihood of lower court review will provide an incentive for the
PUC to adhere to fairer procedures and make careful decisions clearly
based on the case record in the case and applicable law.
In addition to the above recommendation from parties who practice
before the PUC, the Select Committee on Internal Procedures of the
Supreme Court has recommended that legislation be introduced to
eliminate the Supreme Court's original review jurisdiction over PUC
decisions in order to relieve the Supreme Court of
burdensome
case load.
In response to this report, in 1989 Assemblyman Floyd introduced
AB 338 to permit the Supreme Court to transfer the judicial review of
PUC decisions to a court of appeal. The PUC and major utilities
opposed the bill, and it was defeated.

Ex Parte Communication -- The PUC does not have administrative
regulations to monitor ex parte (private, off-the-record)
communications or to trigger a prohibition of such communications in
certain controversial, contested cases. In recent years, the staff
has prepared recommendations for dealing with such sensitive
discussions--but the commission has decided not to adopt
administrative procedures for a comprehensive ex parte rule.
Instead, the PUC has testified that because of its quasi-legislative;
judicial roles, it prefers to make ex parte rules on a case-by-case
basis "in particular cases of great importance and widespread public
interest." Presently, the commissioners, ALJ's and staff not only
meet privately with parties to significant hearings, but also have no
restrictions on discussions involving complaint cases--which are
adjudicatory in nature.
Critics contend that the present laissez faire system with
respect to communications between parties and PUC policy makers is
not in the public interest--because so many important regulatory
decisions can be made behind closed doors without regard to the
public record. They also point out that the PUC has only recently
moved to initiate ex parte restrictions when the Attorney General
raised the concern as a party to controversial cases. Other parties
have defended the system stating that access to commissioners is an
important part of doing business at the PUC.
-4-

Several other federal and state agencies presently have
either administrative or statutorily-mandated procedures for
conducting ex parte discussions. For example, the Air Resources
Board and the California Energy Commission have administrative
ex parte rules in place. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
has strict rules for dealing with telecommunication companies,
including a disclosure rule for less significant proceedings.
The California legislature also recently approved, and
Governor Deukmejian signed into law, the establishment of a
"California Integrated Waste Management and Recycling Board" with
strict ex parte communication restrictions. On the other hand, the
Senate defeated legislation by Assemblyman Friedman to established an
ex parte disclosure rule for the California Coastal Commission.
Administrative Law Judge Reform -- There are two major schools of
thought with respect to what the role of the ALJ's should be in the
PUC. Some argue that they should be independent and make decisions
based on the record, which the commissioners can either agree with,
change or disagree with in their final decision. Certain parties and
several ALJ's have stated that the ALJ draft decision should be a
separate document from the commissioner's final decision, and that an
effort should be made to more clearly define the separate roles of
the ALJ's and the commissioners. For example, critics of the current
system state that because an ALJ's decision presently has to be
approved by the assigned commissioner before it can be released,
great pressure is put upon the judge by the assigned commissioner
to make the proposed decision reflect the commissioner's view, thus
undermining the independence of the ALJ.

The other school of thought argues that historically the
ALJ's are there to assist the assigned commissioners. Some
commission members believe that besides the ALJ's statutory
responsibilities to hear cases, the primary function of the ALJ's
should be to assist the assigned commissioner or commission on
specific cases. Rather than being an independent and public draft
recommendation, they believe the ALJ decision, which reflects the
assigned commissioner's views, should be more a preview of what the
commission will likely decide.
Section 311 of the Public Utilities Code specifies what the
roles of the ALJ's are. The two most important parts of the code are
the following:
(1)
"(b) ... The commission, upon scheduling hearings and specifying
the scope of issues to be heard in any proceeding ... shall assign an
administrative law judge to preside over the hearings, either sitting
alone or assisting the commissioner or commissioners who will hear
the case." and,

(2)
"(d) The administrative law judge shall prepare and file an
opinion setting forth recommendations, findings and conclusions. The
opinion of the (ALJ) is the proposed decision and a part of the
public record in the proceeding. The decision of the (ALJ) shall be
filed with the commission and served upon all parties to the action
or proceeding ... (t)he commission shall issue its decision not sooner
than 30 days following filing and service of the proposed decision by
the (ALJ) ."
-5-

Thus either
concerning the role ALJ's--one of independence or
one of assisting the assigned commissioner--can be supported by
existing law.
Discovery Rules -- Some parties have been concerned that the PUC
does not have rules for "discovery" of information held by parties to
a case or hearing. They contend that some parties, especially the
smaller ones, are left at a disadvantage when it comes to confronting
other parties in PUC proceedings. The PUC has testified that it does
not believe it necessary to establish formal discovery rules.
AB 2252 (Friedman) of 1989, was introduced to require the PUC to
adopt such a rule, but failed passage.
Com laint Procedures -- Some parties have raised concerns about
the
1cu ty 1n con ucting complaint proceedings at the PUC and
have questioned if the new market based regulatory programs adopted
by the commission will make the complaint process even more
difficult to undertake. For example, with new telecommunication
issues involving lucrative competitive services increasingly becoming
the topic for complaints at the PUC, the timing and length of the
complaint process will determine how successful competitors can be in
their efforts to compete with large utilities.
Workshops -- Informal "workshops" as a PUC procedure have
increased in the past few years. They are primarily used to
reconcile or work out the various details (often significant) of
major regulatory reform cases initiatied by the PUC. Some critics
have complained that there have been no standard rules for these
workshops, no recorded proceedings, and that their ad hoc nature has
assisted the large utilities at the expense of the smaller
competitive parties.
III. Legislative Efforts to Improve PUC Administrative and Judicial
Review Procedures
The "Bagley-Keene Act" (Sect. 11125 of the Government Code)
requires that the public be notified of meetings of state agencies
and be supplied with an agenda to be covered at the meeting. Also,
present law requires that copies of public documents to be discussed
be made available and that reports of executive sessions be made
public.
AB 3991 (Moore) enacted in 1984, requires the PUC to compile and
report to the legislature on its rules of procedure on an annual
basis.
AB 4237 (Hauser-1988) and AB 338 (Floyd-1989) would have
authorized a court of appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, to
review PUC decisions.
These bills were defeated.
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In 1989 the Senate Energy and Public Utilities Committee held an
interim hearing on two bills introduced by Chairman Rosenthal:
SB 1125 (Rosenthal) would have established the "Public Utilities
Commission Ex Parte Disclosure Act" by requiring the PUC to adopt
rules governing ex parte communications. Based on FCC rules of
disclosure, which most telecommunication corporations must follow at
the federal level, SB 1125 made a legislative finding that the flow
of information in PUC proceedings was important and "should only be
curtailed where absolutely necessary, but that disclosure of those
contacts should be public information and made part of the record."
SB 1125 did not prohibit ex parte communication--but rather required
the PUC to issue public notices of these contacts.
SB 1126 (Rosenthal) initially would have required that a separate
"Division of Public Utilities Commission Administrative Law Judges"
be created in the Office of Administrative Hearings of the Department
of General Services. The bill was later amended to only prohibit the
approval by a commissioner of an ALJ proposed decision before it was
made public, in order to enhance the independence of ALJ decisions.
Both these bills died in policy committee due, in part, to intense
opposition lobbying by the PUC and major utilities.
IV.

Roberti Preprint SB 8 process/New Legislation

In April 1990, in response to a variety of parties who
believed that the PUC process was unfair, Senator Roberti introduced
Preprint SB 8 which involved both reforming the complaint process at
the PUC and modifying the judicial review process. The preprint was
used by the Senator's staff as a vehicle for discussion on a variety
of problems involving the PUC process--including many issues
mentioned above.
Staff conducted several meetings with parties involved in the
PUC process, and undertook individual meetings with any utility or
party which specifically asked to share their viewpoints on
Preprint 8. The following two bills are the results of those
discussions and meetings and generally address the most significant
topics which the author believes will improve the PUC by implementing
basic procedural changes:
SB 1041 (Roberti)
Existing law provides that judicial review of PUC decisions
resides exclusively with the California Supreme Court. SB 1041 would
provide that judicial review of PUC decisions could be considered in
the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District, and then, if
necessary, by the Supreme Court.
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SB 1042 (Roberti)
SB 1042 would revise PUC procedures by requiring the
commission to establish ex parte communication rules involving
communications with members of the Commission and ALJ's.
This bill would also require the findings and decision of an
ALJ to be based on the record of the proceeding, and would further
require the commission to be bound by the factual findings of the
ALJ, and to explain, with reference to the record, any substantive
changes made by the commission that deviate from the proposed ALJ
decision.
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SENATOR HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL, CHAIRMAN:
then we'll start.

We're going to wait about five minutes, and

I want to thank Senator Lockyer in absentia for his cooperation in

putting together this joint committee informational hearing today between the Energy
and Public Utilities and the Judiciary Committees.
The Senate Judiciary Committee thought that they might be finished by now, but it
appears that they're going a little bit longer.

And we agreed that we would begin this

informational hearing, and Senator Lockyer and Senator Roberti will be joining us,
along with other Judiciary members and other members of our committee.

The reason that

both of the Chairmen agreed to such a hearing at this time was because Senator Roberti
introduced two bills -- SB 1041 and SB 1042 -- which would do some significant things
to the way the State's Public Utilities Commission conducts its business.
The bills would make three simple changes to the PUC:

First, create a new level of

judicial review for PUC decisions; second, create a consistent

~

parte procedure; and

third, make PUC administrative law judges more independent from decisions made by the
PUC Commissioners.
This hearing is needed because although these changes may seem simple, their impact
into the complicated world of the PUC will be significant.

Therefore it is important

for these two committees to understand these bills and what they will do before votes
are taken.
As Chairman of this committee for the past eight years I'm all too aware of some of
the concerns that may be expressed here today.

The theme,

I believe, will be

fairness -- fairness of the PUC process -- in this active time of utility deregulation
and redefinition.

I can attest to the significant changes which have occurred to

telecommunications and energy utilities over the past five to six years, with most
regulatory changes occurring to enhance competition.

I've not agreed with all of these

changes, but I've understood the nature of appointed commissioners and their agendas.
However, it's when I continue to hear criticism of the process undertaken to
achieve regulatory decisions that I get upset.
competitive groups which we've heard

th~

And ironically, it seems to be the

most -- raise the most concerns.

So while

we're supposed to be doing deregulation in order to create competition, the problems
that we've heard have come from the competition.
Some members may be familiar with other attempts to change the PUC process.

Last

session I offered legislation to deal with a few of the topics that the Roberti bills
also address.

Senator Roberti's staff has worked for over a year to review the

concerns raised by various parties which must participate with the PUC.
-1-

The Preprint 8

process, as it was known, brought all interested parties, utilities, consumer and
ratepayer groups to the Capitol to discuss the fairness of the PUC process and how to
improve it.

I want to commend Senator Roberti and his staff for the hard work they've

done to bring an important issue to the Legislature.
With the time constraints today we have selected witnesses to give a broad overview
of the issues involved, and I'm hopeful that they'll speak-- only speak generally
about the bills.

I don't want necessarily to get into the finite details, because

those can be worked out if in fact there is some sort of agreement in the direction the
bills should go.

But now is the time to speak about the process at the PUC and the

problems or lack of them that some may have encountered.
Now, how the concepts of the Legislature would impact it --there'll be other times
to talk about more specific aspects of the bills.

We've asked all interested parties

not testifying today to use the open microphone at the end of the hearing to make one
short statement if they wish, or to submit written testimony for a transcript which
will be made available.

And we are transcribing this hearing.

we have three short panels today, and I want to keep the testimony to approximately
five minutes each if we can, and I hope that you'll please identify yourselves.
let me call the first panel:

And

Audrie Krause; Joel Anderson; Phillip DiVirgilio; Dennis

Mangers; Thomas MacBride; and John McDonald.
Okay, I'm just informed that Mr. MacBride has a time constraint in terms of
catching a plane or something, and so I'll ask him to lead off.

Now, identify your

name and who you represent so that for the record we'll have it there.
MR. THOMAS J. MACBRIDE, JR:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

My name is Thomas MacBride, and I'm testifying today on behalf of a number of entities
that regularly participate in PUC proceeding.

For the record, those groups are the

California Association of Long Distance Telephone Companies, known as CALTEL which is
an association of about 25 long distance companies here in California; the Telephone
Answering Services of California, a statewide association of answering services and
voice mail and voice messaging providers; and US Sprint.

I believe that at least, also

two of the members of CALTEL -- MCI Communications and Bay Area Teleport

have

already indicated their support for Senate Bills 1041 and 1042 to the committee.

The

hour is late and the witnesses are many, so I'll be brief.
First, the groups that I represent want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and the
Senate leadership for addressing the Commission's processes as a priority item this
session.

But I think that it would be shortsighted to simply regard this endeavor that

the Senate is undertaking as a criticism of the agency.

I view it rather as a

recognition by the Senate that the California Public Utilities Commission is the single
most powerful state regulatory body in the United States.
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It's decisions have a daily

impact on consumers and business enterprises throughout the state.
Now while it's a body created by the Constitution, it derives virtually all of its
authority from the Legislature.

And the Constitution expressly provides that the

Legislature will determine the fashion in which PUC decision are reviewed by the
courts.

And it's the view of those who are supporting these bills that judicial review

is absolutely essential to the operation of an agency with that level of influence.
It's got to be more than just cursory judicial review, which is the case today.
A number of proposals are before the committee today, and some are in the proposed
legislation.

You'll probably hear some others from the witnesses.

It's my view,

however, that the single most important provision before the committee today is the
judicial review provisions provided for in Senate Bill 1041, which would establish
judicial review as a matter of right in the Court of Appeal.

Meaningful judicial

review will promote PUC decisions predicated on the record of the proceeding and in
conformance with procedural and substantive provisions of existing law.

In the absence

of meaningful judicial review, enactment of the other proposals may well prove to be an
exercise in futility.

The judicial review provisions, in my view, contained in SB 1041

are the predicate to other procedural reforms.
Now, I'd like to put one myth to rest.

It is simply not the case that judicial

review as provided for in Senate Bill 1041 would result in a flood of litigation, tying
up the Commission's proceedings indefinitely.

Last year in response when there were

some proposals before the Senate last year, I performed a study of the Commission
agendas for the 1989 fiscal year
us already know.

1989-90 fiscal year -- which confirmed what most of

The vast majority of Commission decisions are on contested matters

that could not result in an appeal.

Of the about 1,100 decisions that the Commission

issued during that period, about a fifth could have been regarded as remotely
contested.
And if even half of the non-prevailing parties in those matters were willing to
bear the significant legal expenses and other expenses of proceeding through an
application for rehearing process and then go to a -- take an appeal to the civil
courts, the number of appellate decisions resulting would be less than the decisional
caseload of a single appellate justice.

And if one of these parties seeks a stay of

the underlying Commissioner orders, the party will bear the heavy burden provided for
under existing law of demonstrating some type of irreparable harm, and will probably be
required to post some sort of bond or could under the rules that would be retained even
if SB 1041 is enacted.
The crucial thing is that today neither the Commission nor those that are affected
by its decisions receive any guidance from the court regarding the state of law
governing the Commission's most important activities.

-3-

There've been decisions on

attorneys' fees; there•ve been decisions on attorney-client privilege and whether the
Commission can take -- make rulings on property matters, but nothing -- we haven't had
anything in the last few years on are they -- on what they're doing in
telecommunications, energy, and transportation.
Now, a number of us, for example -- a number of us think that the Commission's
phased deregulation of AT&T violates the statute that happens to exist that requires
hearings when the Commission wants to modify its past decisions.
issue with the Commission without success.

We've raised the

We've raised the issue with the California

Supreme Court, but only one justice has ever voted to hear the case.
dead wrong on this point.

Now, we could be

But the fact is, there's a 1977 unanimous decision of the

Supreme Court that states otherwise.

So we continue to raise the point.

Now, if SB 1041 were enacted, we would have a court at some point issue a written
decision, either reaffirming that old Supreme Court case and telling the Commission to
conform its practice to the requirements of the statute, or telling us we're dead
wrong, so that we can go on to more productive activities.

Either result is perfectly

fine with me, but the present result is simply intolerable.
Now we

and when I say "we" here I mean those of who participate before the

Commission as well as the Commission itself who are affected -- receive nothing in the
way of meaningful judicial review.

Even if the first -- I think this is an important

point -- even if the first year of judicial review under SB 1041 resulted in the
Commission batting 1000 in the civil courts, SB 1041 will have achieved a great deal.
The decisions upheld will bear a mark of legitimacy resulting from the fact that a
court heard and considered the arguments of the appellants and rendered a decision
explaining why the Commission was correct in all respects.

That same level of

legitimacy simply cannot result from a one sentence Supreme Court denial of a petition
for a review.
Last year the Court voted four to three not to hear TURN's appeal of a landmark
telecommunications decision.

And one of the commissioner's interpreted that vote as a

quote, "clear indication that we're on the right track in telecommunications
regulation."

Now, the level of clarity from that vote wasn't apparent to me, but under

the present law the commissioner is entitled to reach that conclusion.

That's the

inference he's allowed to draw from the fact that three Supreme Court justices weren't
able to find a fourth vote to even hear the case.

Had SB 1041 been in effect, some

court would have rendered a written decision either providing some basis for the
commissioner's statement in that regard, or reaching a contrary conclusion.
Again, I'd like to thank the Senate for addressing these issues this year, and I'd
be happy to answer any questions that you might have.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Can you identify some of the problems that the groups that you
-4-

represent have been experiencing at the PUC?
MR. MACBRIDE:

I'd say the principal problem that we have experienced is the

Commission's use of an advice letter procedure to, in essence, deregulate AT&T without
conducting further hearings on the fashion in which it is to be deregulated.

At the

end of 1988 the Commission issued a decision establishing a procedure and a process,
and it was our view that the Commission violated that by simply allowing AT&T to
further deregulate itself with advice letter filings.
Again, we took the issue to the court.
Code requires that you have a hearing.

We said, Section 728 of the Public Utility

We pointed out to the Commission that they

ignored our last filing, didn't do anything.

We filed an application for rehearing.

They dismissed it and said it was improvidently filed.

We filed with the Supreme Court

and got one vote.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. MACBRIDE:

Okay.

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. AUDRIE KRAUSE:

Okay, Audrie Krause.
Thank you, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak on this

issue.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. KRAUSE:

Identify yourself and •••

Yes, I'm Audrie Krause, Executive Director of TURN.

We strongly

endorse the basic thrust of Senate Bills 1041 and 1042 and essentially support SB 1041
as is, and would support SB 1042 with some amendments which I have provided, a list of
our concerns in writing that I'll pass out later.
We think the need for reform at the Public Utilities Commission has never been
greater than it is at this point.

There are severe process related problems that we're

aware of in the telecommunications and transportation industries.

And there are

increasingly frequent examples of similar concerns coming up with the energy
industries.

The absence of any effective judicial review makes these problems even

more serious, so we believe that review by the Court of Appeal is essential at this
time.

The mere presence of the review possibility, we believe, will help to curb some

of the worst of the abuses that we've seen.

And I'd like to give you a few examples of

some recent Public Utilities Commission decisions that have had broad public impact
which the Supreme Court has not reviewed.
The Diablo Canyon case in which there was a contested settlement, the staff had
recommended a $3.4 billion disallowance on a $5.6 billion, I believe it is,
construction cost.

A settlement was reached.

It was contested, and the Court chose

not to hear our request for a review.
P.G.& E.'s residential electric customers are now paying over nine cents a kilowatt
hour for the power they obtain from Diablo Canyon.
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It is the highest cost power in

P.G.& E.'s mix of power that's available, even higher than the much maligned Q.F.'s (?)
contracts that are considered to be the highest in many cases.

The Diablo Canyon power

is actually more costly now, and P.G.& E. has been earning record profits.

This is a

serious impact on the public on millions of customers, and there -- without an
effective way to get review this contested settlement stood.
In regard to the alternative regulatory framework which Mr. MacBride just mentioned
earlier, the Public Utilities Commission essentially disregarded nearly 100 years of
ratemaking precedent to approve the alternative regulatory framework.

It relies on

arbitrary formulas which could result in rate increases at a time when there are
declining costs in the industry.

And since it was approved, we've seen increasing

evidence of monopoly abuse, such as the 18 million in identified cross-subsidizations
of Pacific Bell's non-regulated services which are being paid for by ratepayers, and
the recent revelations regarding late charges and Pacific Bell's problems in handling
the processing of payments on time.
With regard to AT&T the Commission has allowed a rate increase without a hearing,
despite the fact that that company earned a 39 percent profit in the first quarter of
1990, which was three times its authorized rate of return.

We believe that Senate Bill

1041 would provide the opportunity for interested parties like TURN and other public
interest groups to have their arguments considered on the merits of the arguments by a
court.
And I just want to add also that our support for appellate court review represents
a change in position for TURN.

We didn't always believe this was the best idea because

we don't have the same kind of deep pockets that the utilities and some of the other
special interests have.

But we now feel that it's essential that there be this kind of

review because of the problems that have been coming up with increasing frequency.
And I'll answer any questions you have, and would like to hand out written comments
with more detailed listing of some of our concerns.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Why do you think these conditions exist today, and perhaps

didn't exist in earlier years?
MS. KRAUSE:

Well •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. KRAUSE:

I mean, what's changed?

Well, the Commission, of course changes leadership all the time.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I know.

The Commission always changes its membership, so I

don't want to put it on that basis.
MS. KRAUSE:

Other than that, it would be hard to speculate.

Perhaps the fact that

there hasn't been any effective review in many years has created a climate in which the
Commission doesn't believe it needs to be reviewed.

But we see increasing evidence

that they disregard the factual record in deciding cases, knowing full well that
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effectively there is no review.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

They can get away with that.

You spoke about the ability to go to court.

Do you have any

comments about the ex parte procedure at the Commission?
MS. KRAUSE:

Yes, I do.

code some form of

~

In general, we would support the need for putting into

parte rule.

We do have some specific problems with the bill as

proposed, which I've included detailed comments on.

We think that while the commission

has recently reintroduced a proposed rule, they have done so in the past and not
followed through, and we would have concerns about their follow-through in this case
also, particularly since they moved on this after it was clear that there was interest
by the Legislature in doing something about this problem.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. JOEL ANDERSON:

Thank you very much.

Joel Anderson.

Thank you, Senator Rosenthal.

My name is Joel Anderson.

Vice President and Chief of Staff of the California Trucking Association.

I'm

Our

organization is a trade association representing about 2,500 trucking companies in the
State of California.

Their average size is 10 to 15 drivers, maybe 15 to 20 employees,

revenue of about $1 million a year, small business type people.
And we probably have the singular distinction, along with the railroads, of being
the first regulated utilities in California, unlike the rest who are regulated by
statute.

We're regulated by Constitution as part of a transportation company, which

gives us a unique set of problems, but the impact of which has been the same as spoken
by Mr. MacBride and Ms. Krause.
judicial review and the

~

I'd like to address both aspects of the bill -- the

parte rule.

Regarding judicial review, Tom spoke about a 1977 case.

That was a case that CTA

litigated against the Commission and won, and it was a case that said that every party
is entitled to a fair hearing and an opportunity to be heard before the Commission.
Since the Supreme Court made that landmark decision on an advice letter type procedure
which we took the court and won, there's been a steady retreat from that -- not in
terms of the active voice of the justices, but in terms of the leeway that justices
give the Commission in their actions.
You may recall that we approached you when the Commission first set upon to redo
its 1986 transportation decision.

And it compounded one day of hearing after another

and put such a compressed hearing schedule that for anyone outside of government to
participate in a meaningful fashion was impossible in terms of financial strain,
logistic strain, and getting your witnesses there.

Fortunately, through intervention

the schedule became more reasonable, but at the first hearing or just before the first
hearing we had Commissioner Wilk tell us when the decision would be issued by the
Commission before the first shred of evidence was submitted to the Commission for
adjudication.

We find that intolerable behavior, and we're glad that it backed down a
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bit.
We don't think that behavior could occur if there were meaningful review by the
court.

We later took the Commission up to the Court, and like Mr. MacBride, we got two

votes out of seven, four being needed for review.

We think in a prior era we'd of got

the review, but now there's automatic appeal death sentences, all other kinds of things
going to the court, and so their attention is directed away from commercial cases which
it was more active in the '70's.
We strongly support SB 1041 on the level of review and an opportunity to be heard
at the Court on the merits of the case.

We don't want to retry the case, but we want

to make sure that it's heard and the Commission acted in accordance with law.
The second issue, SB 1042 dealing with the
support of the bill.

~

parte rule, we're about 50 percent in

our problem with the bill is we think we should have a right to

approach the commissioners on the quasi legislative cases.

We think you have an

absolute right to address the decision makers there at all times.

But in terms of

enforcement cases, in terms of cases dealing with the issuance of a certificate of an
adjudicatory proceeding which we think could be more narrowly defined than present in
the bill, we would strongly support it.
business of an

~

parte contact in those type cases so.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. ANDERSON:

We think there is no appropriate means or no

Do you have any problem with the disclosure of subject matter?

Not at all.

We would fully

that any time we meet a

commissioner the commissioner would note it down and report it.

We don't have any

problem being noticed.
In summary, we think these bills are long overdue.
forward with them.

We will testify in support.

opposition we'll let you know, like on

the~

We applaud you for moving

In those areas where we have

parte rule.

We think one of the impacts

on the Legislature of the lack of judicial review and fairness at the Commission has
been you've been forced to be involved much more than you ever have in the past
the Commission played by fairer rules in our opinion, they handled the matters.
Legislature gave the Commission policy.
things on a micro level.

When
The

Now you're being forced to go back and correct

It's bad public policy, but you're required to do it because

of what is occurring over there.
We thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Why do you think there's been this increasing concern over the

past few years with respect to the fairness of the process?
MR. ANDERSON:

Well, we've litigated before the Commission since 1934, and never in

our history did we have a commissioner tell us the first day of hearing when the
decision would be out and what days we'd have to brief and what could be expected.
Now, that's an extraordinary statement.

Unfortunately-- actually, the commissioner
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didn't say it.

The assigned law judge said it after he had -- said been in

consultation with the commissioner, and he made sure he said it off the record, but
there were many ears to hear it.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. ANDERSON:

We've never experienced that before.

Would you comment upon the concept of the ALJs in the bill.

Well, you know, last year we came with a suggestion that the ALJs

actually be separated from the Commission and assigned to a different office in the
State of California-- I believe the Office of Administrative Law.
prefer to see happen.

That's what we'd

This legislation moves a step in that direction, and we would

support it.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay, thank you very much.

MR. PHILLIP DIVIRGILIO:

Chairman Rosenthal, distinguished members of the

committee, my name is Phillip DiVirgilio.
Energy.

Mr. DiVirgilio.

I'm Manager of Government Affairs for DESTEC

I'm pleased to appear today before you on behalf of both the California

Cogeneration Council and the California Independent Energy Producers.

I serve as Chair

of electric issues for the California Cogeneration Council, an ad hoc group of
industrial companies who have installed gas-fired cogeneration facilities.

Also I'm

Chairman of Independent Energy Producers, an umbrella organization representing all
forms of alternative energy production in California.
Our groups have strong interest in fairness and integrity of the proceedings at the
Public Utilities Commission.

our companies spend considerable amounts of time and

money participating in a multitude of PUC proceedings.
adversaries of the regulated utility companies.

Generally, we find ourselves as

We're forced to hire attorneys and

expert witnesses to counter the massive efforts of the utilities to lower the payments
of our energy and in general to make us less of a competitive threat.

We'd like to

commend Senator Roberti for introducing these two important pieces of legislation which
we believe will improve the procedural due process of the PUC.
Looking at each bill individually -- first, Senate Bill 1041

we generally

support the concept of effective judicial review of PUC decisions.
regulatory agencies should be subject to judicial review.

We believe that all

The present system of direct

appeal to the state Supreme Court makes it virtually impossible for any party to
question Commission decisions.

The Supreme Court is just too busy; very unlikely that

they will hear most cases, and therefore they're not a true oversight of Commission
actions.

This is of particular concern to our group, since our industry relies heavily

on the statutory direction given by the Legislature to the PUC.
And as an example, Senator Rosenthal, you carried legislation in 1984 that directed
the PUC on how to set prices for natural gas for cogenerators.
ignored major elements of that law in recent years.

The PUC has virtually

And unfortunately, it's not

practical for us to appeal these very technical PUC decisions to the State Supreme
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Court, and as a consequence we've been forced to ask you to carry new legislation
making this law more explicit so that the will of the Legislature can be carried out.
At the same time that we see benefits in an appellate court review of PUC
decisions, we do have a major concern.

OUr industry bears its own cost for appearing

before the PUC and for appealing to any courts.
all their costs borne by the ratepayers.
consultants in supporting their cases.

The utilities, on the other hand, have

This includes their staff, lawyers, and any
And making court review easier may prompt the

utility companies to challenge every adverse PUC ruling.
down-side risk.

Simply, they down have a

We would like to ask you to consider amending the bill so that if a

utility appeals and loses, their shareholders will bear the cost of that appeal.
Now, our fears here are not a matter of conjecture, but actually a matter of fact.
We were victims of a campaign by P.G.& E. to disadvantage our industry.

They once

appealed a very minor and very technical PUC decision that went against them all the
way up to the

u.s.

Supreme Court.

all the legal fees.

They lost at every level, and ratepayers had to pay

Our industry, unfortunately, was forced to respond and respond at

our own costs, so we feel this bill should safeguard against utilities launching
frivolous appeals.
Turning to Senate Bill 1042, we support the major provisions of this bill.

We

support the time periods for assigning ALJs, but also ask you to look at including time
periods for scheduling hearings and scheduling -- and rendering decisions.
Many times we've protested utility actions, only to find the Commission has simply
refused to deal with our protests.

They do not schedule hearings or even workshops; in

some cases, never rendered a decision.

We feel no party should have to wonder whether

it will be able to receive a hearing on a legitimate issue.
Regarding the

~

parte rule, we can support a stronger rule, although we feel that

the rule as written is perhaps a little too sweeping.
based on the facts that we present in the record.

We're content to win or lose

However, sometimes we find it

helpful to clarify our issues in direct conversation.

The bill as drafted makes

~

parte contact a misdemeanor, which we believe is a bit onerous, and some form of
reporting requirements is probably more appropriate.
The bill also limits the commissioners to the facts or determinations made by the
ALJ, and we feel this goes too far.
we feel it's wrong.

This makes the ALJ the single decision maker, and

However, if the commissioners depart from the factual findings of

the ALJ we do feel they should identify those facts in the record that justify their
conclusions.

We don't feel this is a large burden and we feel it will contribute to a

reasoned decision making process.
We appreciate the leadership that you've shown on these important issues, and we
look forward to working with you and members of both committees as this legislation
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comes forward.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

Dennis Mangers.

MR. DENNIS MANGERS:

Mr. Chairman and members, Dennis Mangers; Senior Vice

President, California Cable Television Association.

I have some printed support

testimony I'd like to make available if I may.
And I'd like to just share with you a couple of thoughts about these bills.

I

can't say that as a member, Mr. Chairman and Senator Alquist, I ever paid much
attention to the PUC.

It seems to me -- it seemed to be at the time that we created

this entity for a specific purpose.

It seemed to me to be pursuing that purpose, and

it was dealing in a very complex area of public policy that I for one was very glad to
have them pursuing it, and so that I didn't have to spend a great deal of time looking
at it.
I have to also admit that in the early days of this job representing the cable
television industry I didn't pay much attention either, because the only purview that
the PUC had that affected my industry had to do with public safety issues, and so we
had a few engineers and a few technical people watching over the whole issue for us,
that whole arena.
It then came, however, as the cable industry became more and more successful, that
the telephone companies made it abundantly clear they intended to get into the cable
business.

And they made it abundantly clear they were going to work the congressional

level, they were going to work with the FCC, and they were going to work with the
various state PUCs to facilitate their getting into that business.
We, obviously, became nervous because they had exhibited behaviors in the past that
led to the breakup of AT&T, and we knew that if they could they'd cross-subsidize their
way into our business and we could be gone.
doesn't get very complicated to us.

So I want emphasize from the beginning, it

It's simple.

Life and death matters as they

affect the cable television industry are being decided over there in that
legislative-created body all the time.
support these bills.

And we're here today to tell you that we
and this is the rule we have around

We believe something

here -- we believe something is broke and it does need fixing, and these bills would go
a long way to doing precisely that.
Now let me be specific in this regard.

With regard to the three issues involved in

these bills, what could be the harm in this agency having some level of appellate
review of its decisions?

Can you imagine how sobering it is when your industry is

under the threat mine is from the telco incursion to know that once the PUC makes a
decision that could be life and death for your industry, that's where it stops,
friends.

It doesn't go anywhere else, and you don't have much additional latitude.

If

the Supreme Court, as Tom MacBride just suggested, doesn't take these cases and that's
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the only thing set up in our law, what do you do?

Well for us, some provision for

appellate review is absolutely essential, and we strongly support the concept.
What could be wrong with the independence of the ALJ?
I just came to discover this.

You go over and you watch these administrative law

judges that are assigned to these hearings.

They listen carefully to all the evidence.

They're there every day and they see every nuance.
people.

Then they write up a report.

doesn't see this thing.

Do you know how that works?

They see the interplay of the

You know what happens to the report?

The public

This goes to an assigned commissioner that in many cases has

been out giving speeches, writing articles, and expressing a philosophical viewpoint.
And guess what?

Sometimes that report of the ALJ comes out and it reflects very

accurately the philosophy of the assigned commissioner to the case.
And you know what?

Big surprise.

It doesn't become public until that assigned commissioner gets

to revise it anyway he or she wants to.

So what the public gets to see is not what the

ALJ reported after hearing this case as a law judge.

We get to hear what the assigned

commissioner, who didn't even come to the hearing, thinks.

Well boy, I'll tell you, it

sounds to me like some reform is necessary in that category.
Now, with regard

to~

parte contact, what's the harm in having some rules that

require contact with commissioners on issues of this magnitude to be recorded -- who
was there and what they had to say

so that the press and all of the competitors can

take a look at the record and decide what was the magnitude of the impact, or the
impact on the commissioners before they made some of these controversial decisions so
that the public and all of us -- and I think especially you legislators -- can begin to
get a flavor for is that a fair and equitable process?
As I said, I didn't used to get very concerned.

Now, the level or magnitude of

threat to the industry is so great, our fate is so much in the hands of the PUC
commissioners, we need to guarantee that the Legislature is watching, that they don't
just abdicate entirely the authority to that body, and that they are aware that all is
not totally fair and equitable.

So while I can't list a whole litany of problems to

date, I can tell you, knowing what's coming ahead for my industry, I want to
proactively come over here and support these two bills and ask you to make sure that
that process through which my industry is probably going to go for the next decade,
with life-or-death consequences, is fair and is equitable.

And these two bills, simply

stated, do it, and I urge your support.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

What do you think of the PUC's recently proposed rules

on~

parte communications?
MR. MANGERS:

Personally, we have recommended some amendments to SB 1042 that I

think would work better because they apply to the workshop process that's been
developed in this deregulatory environment since last fall, so we'd like to discuss
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further with the Senator both what the PUC has recommended and what we think would be
more equitable for everyone.

So we're not entirely satisfied with the status of the

bill, but I don't want to nit-pick it to death in this informational hearing.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

MR. JOHN P. McDONALD:

Thank you.

Mr. McDonald.

My name is John P. McDonald.

and General Counsel of Connelley Information Publishing.

I'm Vice President

Connelley Information

Publishing publishes 18 directories -- telephone directories -- in Southern California.
For the most part we did not expect to have any involvement with the Public
Utilities Commission when we opened our operations here in California.
had a fairly simple matter.

We thought we

Telephone directories need telephone listings, and while I

won't go into the actual merits of what did or didn't go on in terms of what we asked
for, the process that we went through was just fascinating.
It began almost six years ago.

We asked for access to listings and were told that

we could not have them because the PUC said we couldn't.
why can't we have this?

We went to the PUC and said,

And they said, because it's not in the tariff.

When we asked

how to go about addressing getting something into the tariff, we were told first to
intervene in an OII -- order initiating investigation -- that was dealing with rate
reform.

We intervened in that proceeding, and shortly after intervening were told, no,

you're in the wrong proceeding.
this proceeding.

The issue you seek to raise here cannot be raised in

You have to go someplace else.

Our alternative was to take and file a complaint case, so we went and filed a
complaint case before the Commission and were proceeding along that avenue.

We also

took and filed a request with the Commission to expand the OII to include the issues
that we thought were important.

They clearly dealt with regulation and reform.

After we were well into the complaint case, the administrative law judge in that
case informed us that in fact we could not raise a major portion of our case in the
complaint case either.

It appeared that we as a customer of the utility didn't have

standing to raise issues that may relate to the reasonableness of the tariffs.
the tariffs that we were trying to change.

It was

Having had the complaint case largely

gutted by this ruling, we were surprised to find the OII directing others interested in
our issues to participate in our complaint case.

We thought we had a nice, simple

dispute.
This proceeded along until the OII or regulatory reform came out.

We were

absolutely stunned to find a bunch of factual findings about the extensive record on
directory needs and on listings issues.

We hadn't been allowed to put those issues

into the case.
The complaint case concluded and we sat for nearly a year waiting for an order from
the Commission.

We finally took and filed a motion with the Commission simply asking
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them to rule.
listings.

Rather than ruling they started yet another OII, this one directed to

After that proceeding had started they did take and come and rule on our

initial complaint.
resolution.

They ruled that we should wait until the OII to find final

It seemed to me we were back to where we started.

The changes to the Commission's procedure that are set forth in SB 1041 and SB 1042
we think will go a long way to solving those sorts of problems.

We have experienced in

the course of our travels through the assorted regulatory processes of the PUC many of
the problems that are addressed in these bills.

We're particularly concerned about

decisions that are rendered citing facts that are nowhere to be found in the record.
When our complaint case was finally decided, nearly 60 percent of the material in that
case related to things that never appeared in that record. They were nowhere to be
found.

They represented things that we had had no opportunity to confront.

Indeed,

there were factual findings about proceedings that had not even been noticed for
hearing yet.

There needs to be a change in the way the PUC does its business.

I think that probably in the past its method of operating, where you were dealing
with utilities that were simply in the business that they were in, may have been
appropriate.

In today's world where the utilities are in a variety of businesses

some of them regulated, some of them unregulated -- the need for the commission to sit
meaningfully as an arbiter of disputes to provide dispute resolution is very important.
Having proceedings on the record, having them noticed, having a right of appeal;
knowing that the real proceeding is there in the hearing room and not out in the
hallway someplace are all things that are very, very important to this process.
We support the bills.

We urge the Legislature to continue their oversight.

We

don't think that the bills by themselves will do enough to change the practices that
evolved over such a long period of time.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
for this number one.

Thank you very much.

I want to thank the panel participants

We'll know call forth the Panel II:

Eckert and the Acting General Counsel, Michael Day.
MS. PATRICIA ECKERT:
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. ECKERT:

The PUC; the President, Ms.

At your convenience you may start.

Good afternoon.
Good afternoon.

I'd like to thank you, Chairman Rosenthal, and the committees for

their invitation to address SB 1041 and SB 1042 today.
My fellow commissioners and I consider these two to be two of the most important
bills on the Legislature's agenda because of their potential impact on the workings of
the Commission.

I would like to address SB 1041, the appellate review bill, first.

As we have in the past, the Commission continues to feel very strongly that
modifying the original scheme for expedited review of CPUC decisions directly to the
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California Supreme Court is a mistake.
process in California.

Such modification will degrade the ratemaking

The possibility of benefits from additional court review will

not outweight the harm.
Let me briefly explain our major reasons for opposing SB 1041.
will be no reduction of court workload.
workload of the Supreme Court.

Number one:

There

It is not true that the bill will reduce the

In fact, there will be a significant increase in the

workload of both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
workload has been the major justification for the bill.

A reduction in court

However, both sides of the

issue now concede that the additional appeals expected in the lower courts will likely
increase the number of petitions ultimately reaching the Supreme Court.

And of course,

there will be a substantial increase in the workload of the First Appellate District,
which is already a very busy court in its own right.
Number Two:
reason.

The existing appellate procedures were crafted for a reason -- a good

There's a reason the Public Utilities Act provided for expedited direct review

to the Supreme Court.

That reason is still valid today.

The appellate review

provisions of the Public Utilities Act of 1911 were drafted by Commissioner and General
Counsel Max Thelen after an extensive survey of procedures in other states.

As

Thelen's report stated, "It is hoped that the procedure thus provided will tend to
prevent the long drawn-out court proceedings and the reliance on technicalities to
which the public utilities have largely resorted in other states to tie the hands of
the states acting through their railroad or public service commissions."
As the Commission's own report in 1912 stated, quote, the provisions of the Public
Utilities Act with reference to procedure have been drawn with considerable care so as
to ensure swiftness and certainty in the proceedings, both before the Commission and
the courts.

In this way it is possible to secure speedily a decision of the highest

court of the state.
Number three:

SB 1041 would eliminate the most important elements of the original

appellate procedure.

It proposes to eliminate direct discretionary appeal to the

Supreme Court, no right of automatic appeal, court deference to the Commission on
factual determinations, and a limitation on the action may take to either affirm or set
aside the order of the Commission.

These elements are all important if utilities and

their customers are to have any real regulatory certainty in this day and age, just as
they were important when the progressive reformers were battling the railroads.
Now, however, the Commission's main litigation opponents are far more numerous, and
many are just as well funded and well equipped, with as many able lawyers as the
railroads at the turn of the century.

In addition, utility regulation has become more

complex and its economic impact affects millions more of the state's citizens and
businesses.

Today it's easier than ever to choose a commission decision at random,
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find several willing litigants who would seek to overturn that decision.

There are

simply more winners and losers, and we were hearing many of those stories in the panel
that just proceeded us.
In addition, the competitive forces unleashed in the regulatory field today give
parties an incentive to use litigation as a weapon to frustrate their competititors.
This has progressed to the point where the Commission has admonished parties from the
bench for filing rehearings or appeals solely to delay their competitor's rate
approvals.

SB 1041 would give these parties powerful new weapons for further delay.

And I'd like Mr. Day at the end of my comments to comment and reply to a couple of the
comments that were incorrect in Panel I.

We would like to clarify a couple of those.

What harmful impacts would result from SB 1041?

Well to begin, the added layer of

appeal would add 12 to 18 months to each appellate case, which already takes from three
to 18 months, assuming the losing party at the court of appeals takes it to the Supreme
Court.

Thus we could face three years of delay before a Commission decision is final.

Further, this regulatory uncertainty costs time, money, effort, and can ruinously
frustrate a well thought through regulatory program.

Many federal agencies such as

FERC are subject to a right of automatic appeal to intermediate federal courts, and
their major policy decisions are routinely tied up in lengthy court battles.
For example, the FERC began to order open access to natural gas in 1984.

Here we

are in 1991 and they're still grappling with elementary questions, such as how can
parties trade capacity rights.
subject to appeal.

This is because every one of their orders has been

Each appeal lasts over two years, and frequently the Court has

overturned a portion of a key decision after it's been partially implemented.

We can

only urge you not to place California's economy in that type of purgatory.
In addition, the current CPUC appellate procedure provides tangible dollar benefits
by providing a speedy final decision.

A rate case increase or reduction in rates, if

held up for an additional 12 to 18 months, could result in the accrual of vast sums of
interest which would have to be paid once a final order has been reached, either by
shareholders or ratepayers.

Even if the order of the Commission is not stayed and the

refund or increase in rate takes effect, parties will have to encumber the money which
they have collected, or which may have to be paid until the Court's decision is final.
For example, in 1987 General Telephone challenged approximately $33 million of a
Commission rate reduction order, and in 1988 Pacific Bell challenged over $100 million
of a rate reduction order.

If the commission orders had been stayed and then reversed,

the resulting interest cost would have run into tens of millions of dollars, and such
uncertainty is a severe burden on both businessmen and individual ratepayers.

Do you

as legislators want the responsibility in this example for loading tens of millions of
dollars of interest payments onto the backs of ratepayers?
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Further, granting an appeal of right in every case, instead of the current
discretionary appeal, would very likely increase the number of appeals enormously,
further clogging the civil appeals process and our decision making.

The CPUC issues an

average of 400 to 450 decisions a year which are not on the consent calendar.

Even if

half of the losing parties avail themselves of the automatic appeal right, the number
of appeals to the CPUC decisions will increase from 15 per year to 200 to 225, an
increase of up to 1,500 percent.
What's worse is that SB 1041 allows the Court to ignore the factual findings and
conclusions of the Commission -- it was these types of complaints we were just
listening to in Panel I -- and to take new evidence which has never been addressed in
the Commission's proceedings.

And as you know, this is very complex material.

We strongly oppose this provision for two reasons.

It will require the court to

consider technical evidence without the benefit of full cross-examination by all
parties to our cases.
weighing such evidence.

It will deprive the Commission of its primary function of
If the courts were equipped to take all the evidence and make

policy decisions in regulatory cases, no Public Utilities Commission would ever have
been created.

Instead, our Constitution calls for a Commission which specializes in

utility regulation vested with great discretion.

In addition, the Public Utilities Act

for the reasons I mentioned above provides for expedited court review on limited
grounds.

It specifically prohibits a trial de novo, which SB 1041 would essentially

allow.
Even if the bill were passed, it could never be effectively implemented as written.
Everyone speculates that the bill will generate vastly more appellate work for the
Commission, yet the bill provides none of the resources needed by the Commission in
terms of additional lawyers to defend our decisions.
And finally, the bill provides that if the Commission grants rehearing, a party may
appeal to the Court if the Commission does not act within 90 days.
simply impossible to meet.

This deadline is

The Commission must grant rehearing, assign an ALJ, take

testimony, permit briefs to be filed, prepare a proposed decision, allow the parties 30
days to comment on the decision before we can issue a final order.

This simply cannot

be done in 90 days, and it cannot be reasonably be done in less than three to six
months in certain complex cases.

Such a deadline is effectively useless.

If the

Commission grants rehearing the party will have to wait for a Commission decision on
rehearing before applying to the court.
The current system does not provide an effective means of review of CPUC decisions.
The number of the parties here today have expressed the notion that there is no
effective review of the Commission's decisions at this time.

We respectfully disagree.

Our own study of other state agencies whose orders are subject to discretionary appeal
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to the Courts of Appeal report that one out of every eight or 10 appeals is accepted.
At the Commission over the last three years one out of every 14 appeals has been
accepted by the Court.

If you eliminate the appeals which were clearly frivolous or

non-meritorious, the ratio was one case accepted out of every eight -- well within the
range of the other agencies.
We are wholly unpersuaded that parties have a less effective right of appeal from
CPUC cases, and we attribute the low number of cases accepted to our rehearing process.
The commission's process allows us to correct many minor and some major flaws in our
decisions before they are appealed to the court.
In summary, this procedural proposal has been strongly opposed by the Commission
for the last three years.

We see SB 1041 as defective in the same manner as the other

proposals, and we urge you to reject the bill and retain the carefully crafted
appellate process, which was designed specifically to meet the needs of utility
regulation in California.
Just as a final note on SB 1041, I noted with interest a recent LA Times article in
which the attorney for the Legislature expressed his pleasure that the Supreme Court
had agreed to hear the lawsuit over Prop. 140 immediately rather than waiting for a
lower court review, because this was a case of "statewide importance."

The attorney

specifically referred to the fact that the expedited appeal would allow a decision to
be rendered before the next fiscal year begins when the mandate and costs would occur.
we rely on precisely the same reasoning to urge you that our cases be heard
expeditiously.

Many of our decisions have statewide economic ramifications that total

hundreds of millions of dollars.

So long as the parties have a fair opportunity to

appeal our decisions and our cases do not unduly burden the court, no case can be made
for lengthy delays in the appellate process for the CPUC.
And Mr. Day, would you like to just set the record straight on a couple of the
items of testimony in Panel I.
MR. MICHAEL DAY:

The three things I would just briefly mention is with regard to

the ALJ-commissioner relationship.

It is a mischaracterization to say that the ALJ's

independent judgment in evaluating the record is not made part of the proposed
decision.

Section 311, specifically including the statute amendments from a few years

ago which this committee participated in, do provide that the ALJ's proposed decision
is submitted to public comment.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

The public does see and comment on that decision.

Let me break in here.

Can you comment on the concept which

said that the decision was made on the basis of testimony or information that was never
presented.
MR. DAY:

Well, I'm not going to comment on the specifics of one particular case

that's mentioned, but to the extent any party can determine that that was the case,
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that's legal error.

But we reject the notion generally that that occurs in PUC

decisions.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

I see a little smirking around the audience behind you.

So, you know, one of the things that comes through to me is that -- I'm not suggesting
that the legislation solves in the best way, but I do suggest to you that there's a lot
of smoke around, and where there's smoke there's some fire.

And there's an indication

that something has changed from what existed previously.
And I think maybe one of the reasons we see the changes is that we went from a
monopoly situation, okay, to a breakup of those monopolies, which changes everything
and suggests to me that something which was in effect in 1909 because of a monopoly
railroad and which existed until the deregulation came into effect a number of years,
that it needs to be reviewed in terms of how one appeals.
MR. DAY:

If I could comment, Senator, I think that you're quite correct that the

source of the additional complaints about the process is the fact that there are many
more winners and losers when we have a competitive industry.
that the procedure itself is broken.

But that does not mean

Many of the people you heard here complained not

really because of the procedure, but because they lost on the policy issues.

And the

thing that everybody has to realize is that even if every single Commission decision
were appealed to the Supreme Court, and somehow the Supreme Court could be compelled to
issue a decision in every case, they wouldn't necessarily win any more of the policy
decisions, because regulatory agencies are granted such extreme latitude.
Court of the

u.s.

has made that very clear.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
policy.

The Supreme

And I have never raised the question about the results, the

What I've raised for the last eight years that I've been on this committee is

the process.

And the process hasn't improved, in my opinion, because on every issue we

get involved in some part of the process; somebody is saying, well, 'it was speeded
up.'

Somebody made a decision before it was going to be happening.

You know, I

couldn't get -- I couldn't hear because I couldn't compete with the utilities number of
attorneys that were involved -- on and on and on so that my concern throughout this
whole process, and I think -- Senator Roberti, I'm glad you're here too -- has been the
process, not whether somebody wins or loses.
MS. ECKERT:

Well, as you know, I've just issued an assigned commissioner's ruling

with respect to the ex parte rule, and I would if I could like to address that in my
comments with respect to SB 1042.
We urged the rejection of the provision of this bill as well.
controversial aspect of the bill is the mandated

~

The most

parte rule, which would certainly

have a very chilling effect on the Commission's decision making process.

And as I

mentioned, on March 22 of this year I issued an assigned commissioner's ruling in our
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ongoing procedural docket which distributed for comment a proposed

~

parte rule.

Our

proposed rule is a sunshine rule which will clearly inhibit -- and that's something you
and I have talked about for the two years I've been on the Commission.

And the rule is

out there and I think that -- and we're very aware of the comments that are coming in
on it, and we intend to put this rule into place.
And our proposed rule will clearly inhibit the majority of

~

parte contacts, but

yet it will ensure that communications between the commissioners and the parties on
important policy issues are not cut off completely.
sentiment for that in Panel I as well.

And I think you've heard some

Furthermore, it provides parties with the right

to rebuttal if these so choose whenever a contact is made.
the submission of the case

The rule would apply from

that is, after the hearings and briefings are

concluded -- until a final decision.
It's our firmly held belief that a Commission -- as a Commission that

no~

parte

rule should be imposed on the Commission by the Legislature, certainly not one with the
inflexibility of SB 1042.

The Commission can and will control its own procedures to

maintain the integrity of our proceedings and to make certain that every appearance of
fairness is maintained in its proceedings.

And as you know, you and I have spent a lot

of time talking about the process, and I am deeply dedicated to putting that into
place.

I think you know my dedication to that.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I think that that may be so about this Commission.

concerns is that if it's good, it ought to be a law -- if it's good.

One of my

Now, because I

don't want the next Commission, whoever that happens to be, to make some other
determination which is different.
The other thing I'd like to make comment about:

I'm not sure that this would have

happened if there wasn't a bill around here saying, hey, there's something wrong.
so maybe what you're doing is correct.

And

But what would be wrong with putting it into

law?
MS. ECKERT:

Well, one of the major problems is that it's terribly over-broad as

it's drafted right now.

It applies strict

courtroom-like~

very similar to those the Legislature has with constituents.

parte rules to contacts
And by that I mean, the

Commission is frequently engaged in policy making, which is far more legislative in
character than a judicial determination of an individual's property rights or fitness
for licensing.
In fact, there's an excellent article written by an Ohio commissioner in the ABA
Natural Resources Journal.
Process."

It's entitled, "The Over-Judicialization of the Regulatory

And the point he makes is a really good one, and that is we want to bring

information in so we can create the best policies, but we want to do it fairly.
want to have the right amount of access.

We

In other words, not a closed door but fair
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access, getting back to the process concerns.

It's neither practical nor prudent for

commissioners to avoid all ex parte contacts.

We simply cannot schedule an en bane

argument in every case, nor are there enough hearing rooms or commissioners to do so.
But we need to make inquires of the parties, and I think under the sunshine

the

proposed assigned commissioner's ruling under the sunshine rule -- we can create such a
rule.
And I think that the key flaw in the bill, though, is the misperception that all
our proceedings are like licensing hearings.

We need to get this input.

We need to do

this in our kind of unusual situation where we're somewhat legislative in nature,
somewhat judicial, and appointed by the executive branch.
For example, in the recent Camp Meeker Water case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that utility ratemaking by our Commission is fundamentally legislative in character and
not adjudicative.

Thus we have a legitimate need for communication with the parties on

policy determinations.
of communication.

And I think you heard in Panel I an interest to have that type

But what's important

MR. DAY: ••• came up with that
SENATOR DAVID ROBERTI:
MR. DAY:

what's more important than denying access •••
California Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court?

Yes.

MS. ECKERT:

A recent one.

What's more important than denying access is to ensure

fair access, and our proposed rule would do that.

And that gets -- it returns once

again, Senator Rosenthal, to the process issues that we've talked about.
about this a lot.

We thought

We've given this a lot of thought, and it's a good-faith setting

forth of the rule that we intend to put into place.

So also we feel that the

flexibility to craft our own rules for specific cases
strict ex parte rule in the Edison merger case.
parties from communication with decision makers.

as you know, we've created a

This is working.

It prohibits the

In certain cases of this type of --

or of this importance where less policy and more adjudication is at stake, such rules
may be preferable, but we would certainly like the -- be allowed to make that judgment
rather than suffering from these very restrictive rules.
Let me just comment for a moment on the role of the ALJs, if I may.
strongly oppose the provisions of SB 1042 with respect to the ALJs.

We also

By making ALJ

findings of fact binding on the Commission, this bill would take the ultimate authority
for decision making and policy making out of the hands of the commissioner and place it
in the hands of the ALJs.

They are not constitutional officers.

They're not entrusted

with the authority to regulate utilities, but the commissioners are.

There's no system

of government that we're aware of that would grant the authority to civil servants
unaccountable to either the electorate or the executive branch, yet our cases are so
complex that the legal standards for reasonable of rates so strict that the power to
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make binding findings of fact equals the power to determine the outcome of the case.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
this forever.

Now let me just break in, okay.

And I have told commissioners

They have to make the final decision, but if in fact ALJs are in fact

directed as to the results that should be obtained, which has been said on and over and
over again, okay.

See, I don't have a problem with an ALJ listening to the testimony,

making some recommendation.

That ought to be available at that point for comment.

If the commissioners want to disregard it completely and make another decision,
that's fine as far as I'm concerned.
MS. ECKERT:

That's their responsibility.

(Inaudible)

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

But if in fact something has changed -- so now the

ALJ's decision does not get exposed to the light, goes to the commissioner first, gets
modified and then is exposed to the light, I'm not sure that we're getting what we
ought to be getting.
MS. ECKERT:
MR. DAY:

Mr. Day indicated he'd like to respond to that.

I would just like to respond, Senator, that as your own committee's

background report for this hearing indicated, there's statutory evidence to the fact
that the ALJs were never intended to have an independent decision they created all on
there own, but were in fact assigned to assist the commissioner in hearing the cases.
That's Section 310 and 311.

Your own people have mentioned that it can be interpreted

both ways.
The historical practice of the Commission is very obviously that the assigned ALJs
are there to assist the commissioners in preparing a decision.

Now the fact that the

ALJ's proposed decision is now published for comment is a fine procedural reform, but
we would say that does not necessarily mean that there can be no communication between
the ALJ and the commissioner.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

No, no.

Tell me what's changed in the last two years or three

years.
MR. DAY:

Nothing.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
that it's not the same.
something else happened.

The procedure is exactly the same as it's been.
Not exactly the same.

Not the same.

We've heard from ALJ's

We've heard from people who had testimony before ALJs in which
It's not the same.

I don't know what took place that

changed.
MR. DAY:

If people have communicated that they're unhappy with the relationship --

the working relationship -- between an assigned ALJ and the assigned commissioner, and
that that's somehow new, they're simply not aware with how the Commission's been
practicing since 1912, because that is a long-standing practice.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

And no ALJ's decision was public before it went to a

commissioner previous to the last three or four years?
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MR. DAY:

Well, before Section 311 was amended to include the publishing of an

ALJ's decision, that's correct.
the Commission or by the ALJs.

There were no proposed decisions published either by
That is new.

That is a new statutory change, and of

course, we're complying with that.
MS. ECKERT:

With Section 311 it is working.

As a commissioner and with two years

of experience, I have -- in none of the cases where I've been assigned commissioner
have I ever had a problem with an ALJ.
plan.

I say, you hear the evidence.

decision, and we team play it.

We'll sit down.

They'll say, here's my game

Let's take a look at the record.

Write your

And I have not had any of those problems.

I don't know

where those complaints are coming from.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MS. ECKERT:

Madam President, you may not be the problem.

Well, I'd sure like to be part of a solution where we get to keep some

ability to •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. DAY:

And I'm trying to get you to be part of the solution.

Well, the thing I would say about SB 1042 that you do have to realize is

that it goes so far in that direction that if you do allow ALJ findings of fact to be
binding on the Commission, you have •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I don't want it to be binding.

I don't want them to be

binding.
MR. DAY:

Then if all you're looking for is an advisory opinion as to what the ALJ

thinks should be in the findings, in fact we're at that situation now.

The

commissioners do not dictate findings of fact and conclusions of law in proposed
decisions.
hearing.

The vast majority of them are prepared by the ALJs in the course of the
Commissioners are looking at policy perspectives at that stage of the

proceeding.

And to characterize it as the assigned commissioners dictating every

little individual
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. DAY:

Not every little •••

That's not the case.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Come on.

You're really begging the issue here.

that they outline every little bitty part that comes out.

It is not

But commissioners have

ALJs have said to us, and it's no secret -- some of them may not be there anymore
because they were forceful enough to make their opinions known.
changed in the process, and I'm concerned about the process.

But something has

I'm not concerned about

the decision, either the ALJ's decision or the commissioner's decision.

That's the

commissioner's responsibility.
MR. DAY:

Well, then I would think the key issue would be whether or not the

initial findings were drafted by the ALJ or the assigned commissioner when the
Commission issues its final decision.

If there is evidence in the record to support
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the findings adopted by the full Commission, as far as the Supreme Court is concerned
there will be no review of findings of fact.
upheld.

The Commission's discretion will be

And that has not changed.

MS. ECKERT:
with this.

And just one other thing, Senator, and I hope you'll be sympathetic

But the imposition of criminal penalties to me is so unduly harsh.

I'm really taking my public service job seriously.
honor and a privilege.

I'm

I mean,

you know, and it's a high

But it is really harsh to be thinking that, you know, you're

facing a criminal penalty for -- that's written into this.

It has a very chilling

effect on communications, and I just don't think that in the legislative aspect of what
we do that it's fair to us to do that, so •••
SENATOR ROBERTI:
MR. DAY:

We'll look into that.

The last thing I might add if I could is with regard to the calculation

of how many appeals there would be.

I think it is an important point.

noted his calculation, but he never totaled it up.

Mr. MacBride

And our calculation of his total

would be over 100 appeals heard by the Court every year versus the four or five
currently heard.

Our estimate is if there were an automatic right of appeal, that at

least half the aggrieved litigants would take them up, and we'd be looking at 200 to
300 appeals heard all the way through each year, which is, you know, a vast, vast
increase in litigation.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

There's no question that would be out of -- I, you know,

something -- the Legislature -- I deal with the Air Resources Board, the California
Energy Commission, the Department of Health Services, other state agencies and
commissions that make billion-dollar decisions affecting California industry, including
utilities.

And their decisions are received at a lower court, not the Supreme Court.

And there have not been that many cases.
MR. DAY:

They're discretionary reviews, I believe.

Are they not?

The vast

majority of the other agencies that we surveyed are all discretionary review, not
mandatory.
MS. ECKERT:
MR. DAY:

This is a big, big change •••

MS. ECKERT:
MR. DAY:

This is different.

Very different.

••• and it's the same thing that's put FERC in the waste basket for six

years.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. DAY:

Well, you would support discretionary review by a court?

I would not support any change in the present procedure, but the

automatic appeal is much, much worse, which is how it's written now.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

You're talking bills and not issues, and that's different.

How does one get an issue looked at if the court won't take it?
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MR. DAY:

Our position is •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I'm not talking about the winners and losers, I'm talking

about policy.
MR. DAY:

I understand that.

We think you're getting the same amount of

opportunity for review as other state agencies at the present.

And if the statutory

scheme is balanced in favor of quick decisions by the court, one way or another, to
provide certainty in the regulatory process, and that overweighs the concept that
everybody should get a chance to go to the court in every single case.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

How many states have another system that goes only to the

supreme court in their state?
MR. DAY:

Can you tell me?

I believe there are several.

study, but I do not know the numbers.
MS. ECKERT:

We can provide that information to you.

(Inaudible)

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. DAY:

There were several back when Thelen did his

Yeah, I wish you would •••

Sure.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

••• because it's my opinion that there aren't very many, and

there aren't very many for a reason.

The supreme courts are not the court that ought

to be deciding those particular kinds of issues.
and losers.

And I'm not talking about the winners

I'm talking about policy which changes as a result of going from monopoly

system to a deregulatory system in which we are supposed to be creating competition.
But it's kind of interesting that the kind of -- that the people that we have created
to create the competition are the ones who are saying, it might just as well have been
a monopoly.
MR. DAY:

Well, you aren't hearing from all the competitors, and I think that's an

important concept to remember as well.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

I'm prepared to have another hearing, and you name the

people who ought to be that we didn't select and I'll be willing to listen to them.

It

just seems to me that what may have been -- and I'm not suggesting that certain things
are not good for long periods of time, but going from a monopoly system to a different
kind of a system in the last eight or 10 years, basically, means that something needs
to be changed in order to release the pressure that begins to build up in these various
kinds of decisions.
And so anything further that you would like to ••• ?
MS. ECKERT:

No, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
SENATOR ROBERTI:

Any comment

?

No, except on the SB 1041.

Just to reiterate the point that

Senator Rosenthal is making, is that the Supreme Court is so inundated with court
cases, death penalty cases occupying the Court's time to an inordinate degree.
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There's

just no judicial review without .••
MR. DAY:

The one thing I might •••

SENATOR ROBERTI:

••• without appellate.

That's why I was persuaded to put the bill

in.
MR. DAY:

I understand your concern, but I would say if you look at the records

over a number of years -- and we can provide them

the Court isn't taking any leas

cases than it did before there were the mandatory death penalty appeals.
MS. ECKERT:
MR. DAY:

Also •••

It's not a significant, to our view and our discussions with the Judicial

Council's people.
MS. ECKERT:
problem.

They're not relying on the workload issue anymore.
No.

In fact they basically unburdened themself of the biggest

Those were lawyers that were being disbarred.

new appeal court, State Bar court set up to handle those.

And there's now been a whole
And the PUC issue got put in

with the number of lawyers case, disbarment cases that they were having to hear.

And

now that that's out of the way we're not hearing any of those kinds of complaints from
the Court any more.

And I think they do a really fine job on the ones that they do

review.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Did I hear a witness -- maybe I misunderstood -- indicate that

there was a case that the Court decided, but you haven't been following it?
MR. DAY:

In 19 •••

No, that was a representation about the CTA case and the definition of --

or rather, the interpretation of Section 1708 on petitions for modifications.

And we

would strenuously object to the notion that we do not comply with that statute.

We do.

They have a different interpretation about what procedures that statute requires, but
we believe we're following the Court's decision.
MS. ECKERT:

And also, with respect to Mr. DiVirgilio's comment about the pricing

of gas, I think that that is -- again, it's an interpretation, and if they don't get
the price that they want then they figure, well, there's something, you know, there's
something wrong.

We'll go around and we'll show them how it's done and we'll take that

tack if they don't get what they want.
losers.

So again, you've got more of that winners and

And the losers now have more money than they used to have, apparently, because

they really -- you know, they put as many lawyers behind this as the winners do.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. DAY:

Okay.

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

MS. ECKERT:

Thank you for the chance to testify.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
Southern Cal Edison.

Panel III:

Pacific Gas and Electric, GTE, Pacific Bell, and

Okay, I didn't have the names of the people who were going to

represent -- oh, I'm sorry.

Okay.

Roger Peters; Chief Counsel for Pacific Gas and

Electric Company.
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MR. ROGER PETERS:

Thank you.

My comments will be reasonably brief.

I guess

responding to your request for a conceptual approach, I'm struck by the fact that the
reference today has been to the fact that the utility industry is moving towards less
regulation, deregulation, affecting competition.
review process, for an

~

And yet the three proposals for a new

parte rule and ALJ independence, seems to be to translate

into greater judicial review, limiting the flow of information to decision makers at
the Commission who are making the decisions on the direction, and putting control of
the decisions -- at least certain decisions

in the ALJs.

Seems to me that there is

a wide mismatch between the direction in which the Utility Commission needs to go and
where these particular three components are going.
That raises, I think to me, the question of what the process here.
judicial process or is it a legislative process?

Is it a

Commissioner Eckert mentioned the

Camp Meeker case in which the Court clearly said, this is a legislative model.
What's a legislative model?

Many of the cases that the Commission deals with are

cases which are not adjudicating past rights.

They are adjudicating or they are

discussing the future.

They are forecasting where the price of energy is going to go,

where rates should go.

That is clearly a legislative process.

That is not a process

in which you want to use a judicial model which puts the blinders on, looks at the
facts as stated historically, and adjudicates the rights of individuals based on those
facts.

That's the wrong model for where this industry is going.

This industry needs

to open up its blinders, look at the future, try to project what's happening, and have
a Commission with full information make decisions on what is in the best interest of
the ratepayers and the utilities in this state.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. PETERS:

How does FERC affect you in that respect?

The same situation; that is, there is an

believe FERC is having some problems with that

~

~

parte rule at FERC, but I

parte rule in terms of legislative

or in terms of judicial review •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. PETERS:

What are the problems that they're having?

Well, as I understand it, on the next decision conference FERC is

considering modifications to its ex parte rule in part because the fact that the
administration -- particularly the President, President Bush -- is concerned about his
ability to communicate to FERC on matters of importance to FERC.

So we're dealing

again with a situation •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Wait, wait.

They're going to change their rules because they

want the President to influence their decisions on something?

Is that what you're

talking about?
MR. PETERS:
agenda item.

I can't presume what they're doing.

I understand that that is an

And there is a question as to whether or not the legislator (?) or the
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executive branch should have the ability to communicate with decision makes on matters
of policy.

I believe the courts generally have felt that there should be that ability

to communicate.

So I think to the extent that FERC is looking at those models, maybe

they're facing some of the problems that we're trying to avoid which might be created
if these bills were enacted.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Utilities have to deal with

~

parte all over this country in

their PUC's or their energy commissions or -- I'm trying to figure out why we are
something special in California in this respect.
sort of an

~

If all the other states have some

parte in law, what -- how do they deal with it?

MR. PETERS:

Well, I don't believe all the states

to the extent that they have

~

have~

parte rules in law.

And

parte rules, at least I suspect that they are more

broadly the sunshine rule that Commissioner Eckert referred to.

That is, they allow

communication to occur, but they allow equal access to communication.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. PETERS:

Yeah.

This particular bill does not allow communication to occur.

communication down entirely.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

It shuts it off.

I don't want to talk to these bills.

concept of what makes sense.

It closes

I want to talk about a

If you're saying, for example, we need sunshine, and I

heard the President indicate the concept, what's wrong with putting that into law?
MR. PETERS:

Well, I think this bill doesn't put sunshine in law.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
very strict

~

MR. PETERS:

parte just put in?
I don't know.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. PETERS:

Think they're going out of business?

I hope they're not.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. PETERS:

How do you utilities deal in Florida where they just have a

So do I.

All I can say

I mean, getting back to the approach, if their

~

parte rules operate in the way this legislation would, I suspect that they're going to
have problems; not only the utilities, but other parties who wish to change the
structure, who believe that something else ought to happen that's not happening.
mean,

~

I

parte does open access for both individuals.

In terms of the scope of review, I guess I would just like to comment.

There's

been some reference that there aren't major cases considered by the California Supreme
Court.

I beg to differ.

P.G.& E. has a very large nuclear power plant that the

Supreme Court heard a case and issued a decision on the interim ratemaking that was
authorized.

That was a billion or multi-billion dollar case to us.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. PETERS:

When was that?

That was in, I believe 1987 or 1988.
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That was on the interim

ratemaking.

That case was heard by the Commission.

Similarly, the Commission did issue its decision on the settlement, Diablo Canyon.
We believe that was a good settlement.
operate.

It puts us at risk if that plant doesn't

And that particular settlement, parties briefed that to the California

Supreme Court, that they felt that the procedures there were appropriate.
that the Court ignored it.

It's not

The Court looked at the briefs of both parties and they

decided that there wasn't an issue that was meritorious for consideration.
believe it's fair to make the leap in judgment that that was no review.

I don't

So I think the

standard review is different than it has been represented here.
In terms of what happens if you change it, there's nothing to lose.
everything.

Appeal as a matter of right.

the policy of this state.

You appeal

That's not a situation that I think enhances

The references as to the number of cases -- I suspect 200,

300 -- that's probably a good estimate.

Certainly there's nothing to lose if you do

it.
Just make a couple of other comments.
that you need to open communication.

In terms of gx parte, as I said, I believe

Most of the rules, at least a concern that we

would have as to any rule or any statute, would be that it applies to all parties
either way in all directions.
Finally, as to ALJs:

Again, I guess I close on a note of irony.

It seems to me

that in a discussion as to whether or not there should be greater judicial review, to
enact legislation that says absolutely whatever the finding of fact of an ALJ is shall
not be reviewed by the Commission, if it's not reviewed by the Commission it's hard to
believe it would be reviewed by the Court.

That seems to me to go in the opposite

direction.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. PETERS:

Excuse me.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. PETERS:

Let me just ask you something, because •••

I'm sorry.

There is one other point I wanted to make.

California Energy Commission.

You referenced the

I would just draw your attention to the fact that Public

Resources Code Section 25531 provides that judicial review of a licensing matter or
certification of a utility power plant is directly to the California Supreme Court, the
exact same rules as the Public Utilities Commission appeal.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

One of the things that we hear about, and it's kind of an

interesting expression, and I'd like to know if somebody has some comment.
concept of the fifth-floor decision, or the fifth-floor approach.
about.

Have you heard that?

MR. PETERS:

Has anybody heard that?

Well, all decisions are made on the fifth floor.
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There's the

Tell me what that's

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. PETERS:

Okay.

Not on one-on-one basis?

Pardon me?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. PETERS:

Oh, okay.

Is that where somebody can walk up to the •••

I believe decisions made on the fifth floor and announced in the

Commission -- in the open Commission's decision conference based on any discussion at
that point.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. BRUCE JAMISON:
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. JAMISON:

Okay, thank you very much.

Let's see:

Bruce Jamison.

Senator, I have some prepared remarks.
Fine.

Senator Rosenthal, Senator Roberti, my name is Bruce Jamison,

representing Pacific Bell.

Many of the parties who have spoken so far have taken

positions which are similar to Pacific's, and I won't repeat what they have said in a
very eloquent way.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. JAMISON:

This will make part of -- so if you'll just kind of tell us.

With the exception of

~

parte, Pacific is opposed to the positions

that are outlined in the bills as they are written.
oppose it as well, but we are certainly in favor of

And in the case of
~

parte rules.

~

parte we

we have been on

record publicly to that regard in the past in hearings before your committee
December of 1989, I believe.
But I concur with President Eckert and with the preceding speaker that the

~

parte

rules as described in your bill are draconian in nature and would close off
communication rather than provide sunshine, particularly when we deal with a
~~asi-legislative

type process at the PUC.

Disclosure is certainly a welcome item, but

cutting off communication is not welcome.
As to the issue of appeal, the issue of trial de DQYQ as spoken to earlier is of
grave concern to Pacific, and I would second the comments that have been made by
previous speakers to that regard.
And finally on the ALJ issue, the issue of whether or not ALJ decisions have an
opportunity to be commented on by the public seems to have been overlooked, although
Mr. Day pointed that out very clearly.

There are very specific comment cycles outlined

in the Commission's own rules in which -- under which if a party feels that there has
been an error in the proposed decision, that is the opportunity to bring it to the
attention to the Commission.

And the Commission does not vote on the decision until

after those comments are in.
With those in mind, noting the hour, I think that it's been said well by others.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. KEN OKEL:

Thank you very much.

Ken Okel.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, my name is Ken Okel and I'm •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I'm sorry about the pronunciation.
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MR. OKEL:

It's common.

I'm Associate General Counsel for GTE California.

A lot of our concerns, I think, were very well summarized by Commissioner Eckert in
her presentation.
about perhaps

~

I would like to perhaps -- you were asking for some information
parte laws in other states, and I can speak only of one state in which

other than California in which I've been involved in a case, and that's the State of
washington which has a rule which says basically that all the commissioners must
attend.

They have an

~

parte contact rule, but offsetting that is a rule which

requires all the commissioners to attend every hearing in every case that's before it;
or if they don't attend a hearing they are required by statute to read the transcript
of that hearing each day.

Given the incredible number of matters that are before this

Commission, I think that type of rule would be unfeasible in California.
And I think, given the length of the proceedings, the complexity of the
proceedings, there is a need to have some communication between the utilities and the
commissioners and other people to talk to commissioners.
some sort

of~

And I think the -- we support

parte rule, and I think what's going to take place before the

Commission is a good idea.
You are suggesting that these type of rules properly belong in statutes so some
later Commission doesn't change the rule.

I would suggest that type of rigidity is not

really particularly useful in the long-term situation.

I think you need some

flexibility to allow rules to adapt; as new information comes to the Commission's
attention, it can be incorporated in the rules.

If there is a rule in effect,

obviously, that rule would be available for inspection by the Legislature.

You would

have some -- as part of perhaps your oversight role to just see what's going on, and
you would know and could ask questions should they -- concerns arise.
Getting back to the appellate review bill, we are

like the other parties who

have been opposing this legislation, are quite concerned with the impact this might
have on getting cases decided which are quasi-legislative in nature.

And that's really

the application proceedings, the investigations, and this type of proceeding.

From our

own experience, we have cases that go -- and our last, when we were in the rate case
mode, we have 95 days of hearings in a 1988 rate case which still hasn't been finished.
We had 61 days of hearings in this new regulatory framework investigation.
so I think one thing you should keep in mind in this legislation is to realize that
California in many ways is very different from other states.

I don't think there's any

state in this country that has so much up-front openness in its PUC-type proceedings in
terms of receiving and developing a very extensive and exhaustive evidentiary record.
From talking to my counterparts who work in other states, a rate case can be decided in
two weeks in other states.

In California that's

that would be unheard of.

There's

just a lot of input that the Commission receives in carrying out its quasi-legislative
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functions.

So when you get down to the time a decision is made, you have a very, very

full and complete record.
So our concern is if you go through this lengthy process, you have a year of
hearings, and then you go ahead and have additional years of appellate review of an
automatic right of appeal, and then people challenging that and going to the Supreme
court, you'll never get things resolved.

You're going to have cases that are pending

for years and years and years, and I think that is not in the public interest.
to close -- get closure at some earliest possible point.

You got

I think Commission Eckert

stated the process going directly to the Court is an excellent way to

Supreme

Court -- is the excellent way to do that.
We were concerned about one provision of the bill concerning the standards for
judicial review and quasi-legislative proceedings.

It seems to me the way the bill is

currently written that you have a substantial evidence test to justify any action made
by the Commission.

That is far different from the standard that the courts have used

in California consistently regarding review of quasi-administrative type decisions.
The standard there has always been whether the courts -- the decision of the agency is
arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support.
And I just cite you the case of Pitts vs. Perless at 58 Cal 2nd, Page A-24.
that's discussed at page A-33.

And

And this doctrine has been around for many years.

There's no -- for quasi-legislative decisions you don t have a substantial evidence
test.
And think it was interesting, just going back to Panel I's comments:

It's from the

comments that were made there, the concerns that were expressed by some groups (?), and
I'll use TURN in particular about certain Commission action, in that in effect what
they're asking that they want the courts to do is to be a quasi -- or super Commission
to review the policy decisions adopted by the Commission.

She used examples of the new

regulatory framework case, the rate of return earned by AT&T, and some other
proceedings; the P.G.& E. settlement agreement.
They're asking for the --what they're looking for the courts to do is becoming a
body to challenge the policy determinations made by the Commission and to second guess
the Commission, if you will, not necessarily from a legal point of view to decide if
those policies are good for the State of California.

And I submit the California

Commission as a constitutional agency is the body who should be making those decisions.
The courts should be looking

at decisions if at all from the point of view of a

leg(al) -- whether they've followed, they've met the legal requirements that apply.
In the case of -- there's standards where they look at the evidence independently,
if constitutional rights are involved.

And if they're not constitutional rights, then

you have to look at the arbitrary, capricious nature of decisions, a very limited type
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of review in those type of quasi-legislative type decisions.
Again, I think those really are the substance of our comments.

Again, I think we

generally -- are in general agreement with, I thought, the very carefully thought out
comments of commission Eckert and Mr. Day and the views expressed by some of the other
panelists on this Panel III.
MR. JAMES LEHRER:

Thank you.

Thank you, Chairman Rosenthal.

In view of the time I will try

and trim my prepared marks down as much as I can, as well.

There are a few remarks

that were made earlier that I would like to respond to if I may.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Fine.

Okay.

If you have written testimony we'll accept that

as part of the record.
MR. LEHRER:

Well, I would like to work into it •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. LEHRER:

Fine.

Okay.

••• my response to some of the earlier comments I heard, if I may.

Edison appreciates the opportunity to comment on Senate Bills 1041 and 1042.

We

oppose both of those bills because we believe they would impair the commission's
ability to render timely and informed decisions.

We see no benefits to the regulatory

process that would offset the detriments that the bill would cause.
Let me first note a few comments with respect to SB 1041.

It would not -- and it's

been said before, but it bears reiterating -- relieve the Supreme Court's workload.
Quite the contrary, it would increase the workload of the state's appellate system in
general, including that of the Supreme Court, because once a party has filed a petition
with a lower court of appeal it's a simple matter if they get a decision that's
unsatisfactory to slap a new cover on it and try it before the Supreme Court.
doesn't cost that much more in terms of dollars and lawyer input.

It

But it certainly

would cost that much more in terms of time to the parties who are looking for finality
to the decision.
In the meantime, the final resolution of ratemaking decision involving hundreds of
millions of dollars and major policy determinations of the Commission would be delayed.
And the state's statistics indicate that just on appeal to the Court of Appeal, those
delays would be on average 18 months.

Major utilities have general rate cases every

three years; cost of capital adjustment every year; fuel clause proceedings in the case
of energy utilities every year.

And appeals of right to the Court of Appeal causing

delays on the order of 18 months each could cause three of these cases, for example, to
stack up so that you could have an amount in jeopardy of, in Edison's case, an amount
equal to Edison's total annual earnings -- $700 million.

You stack up a general rate

case, a fuel clause proceeding, and a cost of capital proceeding, you could easily get
that much money in jeopardy.
Now, just to put that in perspective, you and I would be hard pressed to plan for
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the future if we new that our whole annual income was going to be suspended or put in
jeopardy.

Similarly, utilities• ability to plan is

the imposition of that kind of delay and uncertainty.
that in 1911, and the need for prompt and effective

to be severely hampered by
And this Legislature recognized
is no less important

than it was back in 1911.
I'd like to turn to SB 1042 for a moment.

It seems to be that the thought behind

that bill loses sight of the fact that the Commission, not the ALJ, has the duty and
authority to set policy and to make decisions and findings of fact and conclusions of
law.

It would make the ALJs a driving force in setting policy, and it would

substantially diminish the Commission's role in establishing policy.
As far as the

~

parte communications between commissioners and the ALJ until the

draft decision has been issued, that bill again confuses ALJs with civil judges.
ALJs are not members of the judiciary.
accountable to the Commission.

They're merely hearing officers.

The

They are

The public interest would not be served by barring

communication between the ALJs who must implement the Commission's policy, and the
commissioners who must set that policy.
The~

parte rule that's proposed in

less accessible.

The intent of the

~

sa

1042 would make members of the Commission

parte rule may be to improve the regulatory

process, but we don't believe it would accomplish that objective.
accessibility are essential for effective

Openness and

I'm sure that the legislators

recognize the importance of talking directly with their constituents and finding out
what s on their minds without the filter of an institutionalized, legalized process.
Of equal importance to the Commission is a direct understanding of the concerns of
their constituents and of the many complex issues which they must consider in
establishing the state's energy policies.
court.

The Commission is not and should not be a

Just as legislators here reach out in an effort to understand the issues before

them and to craft informed solutions, the Commission should be allowed the same
flexibility in the conduct of their legislative -- quasi-legislative functions.
In addition, we see the institution of an

~

parte rule as a step in the direction

of increased formality and heightened barriers to communication at a time when the
Commission is working very hard to be a more open, accessible forum for the average
person to participate in.

We think they've been successful in the past two years in

that, and we think that Section 1042, particularly with its criminal sanctions,
sends the wrong signal.
In conclusion, we think that these bills would detract from rather than contribute
to the effectiveness of utility regulation.

And finally I would note that of the six

concerns that are identified in the package that was distributed prior to this
informational hearing, three are not even addressed.
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We met with members of the

legislative staff to discuss those, and I participated in the sort of the kick-off
meeting, if you will, where we heard some of the original concerns expressed by the new
competitive players.

And the concerns that they seem to have, including the conduct of

workshops and the timing of Commission proceedings, are things that perhaps could be
more fruitfully explored in Commission rule makings than the imposition of these rules,
which we don't believe would really address the kinds of concerns that the parties have
expressed.
In addition •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Would you sum up, because you're repeating some of the same

things that have already been
MR. LEHRER:

Yes sir.

I'm almost done.

I'd like to point out that Mr. MacBride

called for, to quote, decisions of the Commission explaining why the Commission was
correct in all respects, unquote -- if my notes captured his words correctly.

And I

think that it's very clear that what he is representing here is a judicial model of
regulation, and I agree completely with Mr. Peters' comments that that is quite
inappropriate to the task the Commission has before it.

And it's not surprising to me

that a private attorney would be more interested in a judicial model and take their
chances with the courts than relying on the expertise of the Commission.
Similarly, I would note that Ms. Krause also clearly, explicitly stated that she
wanted the courts to review the merits of CPUC decisions.

So if you're talking about

reviewing the Commission process, I think you're not in sync with what some of the
other parties here are suggesting.
their merits.

They want the Commission decisions reviewed on

So let's make no mistake about it.

The number of appeals and the extent

of the appeals would be very, very great.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
many times.

My concern is not the winners and losers.

I'm concerned about the process.

I've expressed that

And I must say that it would be

difficult, in my opinion, for a utility to take the PUC to task for anything they did
in terms of the process.

And I understand that.

At the same time, hearing from all of the others, those who were here and those who
were not here, indicate that there is some kind of a problem.

And maybe -- it kind of

disturbs me that because there's a bill we now have sunshine, whatever that means.
I have no problem with sunshine.

And

But if the bill goes away, does the sunshine go away?

See, I don't know the answers, really.

And because of the number of groups that have

been concerned about the process is the reason that I'm even interested in the subject
matter at all.
I have to tell you that there are no secrets around Sacramento, okay.
something happens, it spreads pretty quickly.

And when

And we hear about them, and what I'm

trying to get to at some point is how we put out the smoke that's all over the place in
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terms of the process.

When somebody says, you know, you've got -- I need a decision by

this date, and that may be difficult for anybody, then I wonder, you know, why that's
done.

And I'm not suggesting that there isn't enough

time to make your case or whatever it happens to be.
with a

that you shouldn't have enough
But almost no one can compete

that doesn't want to give up something, if you understand what I'm

saying.
MR. LEHRER:

I do, Senator, but maybe I've been in the trenches too much these past

10 years, but I've got the scars all over me to show me •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. LEHRER:
and take.

I understand.

••• that there's a great deal of-- a great deal of advocacy and give

The utilities are not always the winners by any stretch.

And we're as

committed to having an effective PUC process as anyone.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I am too.

And if in fact these hearings --and we'll probably

have some more -- if they push us in the direction of the process being cleaned up so
that people feel they've gotten a fair shake, then I'm really not concerned about
somebody who lost something.

But if somebody lost something because they didn't have

enough time to present their case or because their attorney had to work on Saturday and
somebody else's had more attorneys that could fill in for somebody who didn't want to
work Saturdays, then those are the things I become concerned about.
Anyway, I thank you very much.
MR. LEHRER:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. JAMISON:

We now have •••

Senator, I'd like to add one comment here.

issues here I talked about

~

parte.

In my discussion of the

I think we've seen a display on the part of the

Commission of a willingness to undertake a review of those rules, and we ought to let
that process work; let them work out those

~

parte rules.

The issue may have been

raised here in the past, but certainly this Commission is moving in that direction.
And again, Pacific supports that move.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I am pleased that they are moving in that direction, and I

want to thank the President for that movement.

It seems to me that once she or they

decide what it ought to be, then we ought to have some law which says, that's what
you've got to do.
MR. JAMISON:

Well, I think •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I'll tell you something.

Otherwise, it changes.

It will

change every time there's a new Commission or a new president, and that's not what
ought to happen.

If it's good then it's good.

it doesn't work we'll change the law.

And if it's not good it's not good.

If

We do that all the time.

, I want to thank the participants.
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we now have an open microphone available

for short comments.

Nobody's going to read a long statement.

If anybody in the

audience would like to come up and make a one-minute comment about anything, you have
the ability now to do that.

Just identify yourself and in one brief statement tell us

what you think.
MR. DAN BAKER:
Committee.

My name is Dan Baker, and I represent the Ad Hoc Carriers

And I probably •••

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. D. BAKER:

Ad Hoc Carriers Committee.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. D. BAKER:

The Ad Hoc what?

Carriers Committee.

Okay.

And we participated in all the major PUC general freight rate cases.

In fact the Commission in 1986 adopted our program for the regulation of all general
freight rates in California.

I have experience before all courts in the United States,

appealing from regulatory commission decisions.

I have had no trouble whatsoever going

to the U.S. District Court, three judge court; I've gone to the Circuit Court of
Appeals, United States Supreme Court.

We do not have any problems.

But we do have

problems with the procedure of the California PUC.
You asked for a specific example.
freight case.

We had 58 days of hearings in the last general

You could look at that decision and you'll find -- very pressed to find

any reference to the factual information that's presented in that proceeding.
eight months after the case was closed you'll find the key element:
price floor, or minute rate.

It was not mentioned.

However,

the variable cost

It was not discussed.

It was not

introduced in that proceeding, but that most important element of the whole decision
came up eight months after the case was submitted.
Not only that, but you had -- under the Commissions' regulations you're supposed to
have findings of facts and conclusion.

On this important element there were no

findings of facts and conclusion because there was no discussion of the matter.

The

statutory provision •.• (TAPE TURNED OVER) ••• to the public and to the Commission with
regarding to filing common carrier rates and tariffs.
10 days.

And there're other elements to that decision.

people say they got one.

The Commission changed that to
I appealed a case, and I've

I got three votes, but close is only good in horse racing,

nothing else.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. D. BAKER:

Horse shoes.

Now, with regard to the fear of these rate cases, I was going to

bring an article that was in the paper about six months ago when the Commission bragged
that there were no major rate cases considered in 1990.

And the reason for that is

they set up formulas that are voiding their duties to set rates.
by the Commission any more.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

The rates are not set

They're set by the utilities, by the carriers.

Thank you very much.
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MR. D. BAKER:
of

~ ~:

One last statement.

Look at them.

With regard to the Commission's proposed rules

They are not

~

parte rules that are going to curb

anything because it eliminates the rules case.

It eliminates the investigation cases,

the most important cases that the Commission considers.
Furthermore, the ex parte rule is only triggered after the case is submitted.

It

can go on for a year or six months, and all during that time the matter is wide open
for

~

parte communications.

If there's going to be

an~

And only when it's submitted does it become effective.
parte rule it's going to have to come from the

Legislature, not the Commission.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
into and question.

Okay.

I think that that's one of the things we ought to look

As a matter of fact, I'd like to get an answer form the President.

I wish they had stayed around so the PUC could have heard these comments.
Be interesting to take a look at what that
MR. D. BAKER:

~

parte -- what it doesn't do.

Your honor, it's rather simple.

Look in the first paragraph, about

four lines, and you'll come to the same conclusion.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. STEVE BAKER:

Okay.

I thank you very much for that comment.

Yes sir.

Mr. Chairman, Steve Baker with Aaron Read and Associates

representing the Association of California State Attorneys and Administrative Law
Judges.

We represent the administrative law judges that work at the PUC, and would

like to indicate our support for both SB 1041 and 1042.

We also appreciate your

ongoing efforts to provide some reform at the PUC, and we look forward to working with
both you and Senator Roberti on the successful passage of these measures.
Thanks again.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

Anybody else?

Quickly -- one minute?

Thank you very much for coming, and we'll be continuing with the hearings at some
point.

--ooOoo--
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COMMENTS OF TOWARD UTILITY RATE NORMALIZATION
ON SENATE BILLS 1041 AND 1042
April 9, 1991
Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), the only
statewide residential consumer group that regularly
participates in proceedings before the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC), strongly endorses the basic
thrust of Senate Bills (SB) 1041 and 1042.

We support SB

1041 essentially as is, and could support SB 1042 if it were
amended to address certain concerns noted in our written
comments, which we are submitting today.
The need for comprehensive procedural reform at the
CPUC has never been greater.

While process-related problems

have been most severe in the telecommunications and
transportation industries, similar concerns are arising with
increasing frequency in the energy area as well.

The

seriousness of the situation is compounded by the virtual
absence of any real judicial review.
In TURN's view, the single most important aspect of the
bills before you is the provision for Court of Appeal review
of PUC decisions.

This element is crucial, because the

existence of an effective review mechanism will go a long
way toward restoring the Commission's own sense of selfdiscipline.

With virtually no significant court review over

the last decade, the Commission has been able to "get away
with" poorly reasoned and procedurally defective decisions.

The mere presence of an effective review mechanism will
deter this disturbing trend toward arbitrary, and sometimes
even sloppy, decisionmaking.

Of all the potential changes

that the Legislature could enact, this one clearly offers
the greatest "bang for the buck. 11
The Supreme Court's reluctance to review more than a
handful of CPUC decisions over the last decade, while
perhaps understandable in light of the Court's workload, has
nonetheless been extremely frustrating to parties such as
TURN who have sought to appeal major Commission decisions
with broad public impact.

Some of our unsuccessful attempts

to obtain Supreme Court review have included challenges to
CPUC decisions that:
1) Approved a contested settlement of the Diablo Canyon
nuclear powerplant reasonableness review and adopted a price
formula for Diablo generation that has resulted in
substantial rate increases for customers and record profits
for the utility;
2) Discarded almost a century of ratemaking precedent
by approving a "new regulatory framework" for local
telephone companies that relies on arbitrary formulas rather
than detailed review of utility costs to set rates;
3) Approved a contested settlement of the Palo Verde
nuclear plant prudency review, which tied Edison's cost
recovery for that plant to the CPUC's decision on the

2

reasonableness of the costs of a different nuclear plant in
a different state; and
4) Granted AT&T the right to increase its long-distance
telephone rates without a hearing, despite the fact
that company is still the clear price leader in the only
partially competitive residential long-distance market.
Under SB 1041, TURN would gain at least the opportunity
to have its arguments on such major issues considered on
their merits by the Court of Appeal.

Today, parties who

take the gamble of seeking judicial review can only wait to
receive the seemingly .inevitable postcard denial in the mail
from the Supreme Court.
I should point out here that TURN has only recently
come to the conclusion that intermediate appellate review is
necessary.

While proposals such as this one have surfaced

from time to time over the years, TURN previously withheld
its support out of concern that the review process would be
dominated by the utilities and others with the "deep
pockets" needed to hire an additional staff of appellate
lawyers.

Obviously, small non-profits such as TURN do not

enjoy that luxury.

Nonetheless, we have now become

convinced that the problems at the CPUC are so severe that
effective judicial review is the only workable solution.
SB 1041 would also establish a requirement that CPUC
decisions be supported by substantial evidence in the record

3

of the proceeding.

Under the current "any shred of

evidence" rule, TURN's lawyers have frequently concluded
that even poorly reasoned or arbitrary Commission decisions
are not worth appealing, because the standard of court
review is so narrow.

Effectively, Commission decisions can

now be challenged only if they violate a specific statute or
result from procedural errors.

Given the general nature of

most provisions in the current Public Utilities Code, even
the most illogical or capricious decision may therefore
escape judicial review altogether.

A "substantial evidence"

test would go a long way toward insuring that the Commission
is more careful and thoughtful in its decisionmaking.
By way of comparison, it is not at all uncommon today
for the federal appellate courts to remand orders issued by
administrative agencies such as the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) on the grounds that the
agency's reasoning does not support the ordered result.
such decisions often do not overturn the agency's
conclusions at all-- they simply require an understandable
logical explanation of the thought process by which those
conclusions were reached.

As minimal as this degree of

court oversight may seem, it would be nothing short of
revolutionary if a CPUC decision were overturned on this
basis.

Today's appellate review process in California does

not require that the Commission use logical reasoning based
on record evidence, but TURN believes that it should.

4

TURN therefore applauds Senator Roberti for introducing
SB 1041 and strongly urges all members of the committee to
approve this "good government" legislation.

PROPOSED LANGUAGE CHANGES
SB 1041
Section 1756: At page 4, line 7, the word "agreeing"
should read "aggrieved."
Subsection (c), lines 22-28.

This subsection is

supposed to establish that the "date of issuance" is the
date when the Commission actually mails its decision, which
is often several days after the date of the Commission
meeting.

The proposed new language is confusing and unclear

however.

TURN prefers the existing language that is already

included as the last sentence of Section 1756.
Section 1756.1: This new section is superflous, because
the same provision is included in Section 1758(a).

SB 1042
Section 3 (page 3).

This section of the bill would

split the current Section 1705 into five subsections and
make certain changes.

We will address each of the new

subsections in turn.

5

Subsection (a} simply carries over what are now the
first two sentences of Section 1705, with only minor
editorial changes.

TURN suggests a further modification, to

remove any implication that the requirements of this section
apply only in complaint cases.

There is no apparent reason

for such a limitation, and no such distinction exists in
current PUC practice.
(a) At the time fixed for any hearing before
the commission or a commissioner, or the time to
which the hearing has been continued, [the
complainant and the corporation or person
complained of, and such corporations or persons as
the commission allows to intervene] all parties to
the proceeding, [shall be] are entitled to be
heard and to introduce evidence. The commission
shall issue process to enforce the attendance of
all necessary witnesses.
By changing the language from complainant, etc. to all
parties, it becomes clear that the section applies to all
hearings before the Commission, not just hearings in
complaint cases.
Subsection (b) would require that the ALJ's decision be
based on the record of the proceeding.

TURN agrees.

Subsection (c) would state that the Commission is bound
by the factual findings of the ALJ and would further require
the Commission to explain, with reference to the record, the
reasons for any substantial changes it makes to the ALJ's
proposed decision.

TURN sees no good reason why the

Commission should be bound by the ALJ's factual findings.
on the other hand, the Commission should be required to

6

explain the reasons for any changes it makes.

This

represents a very minimal burden and will help to assure
reasoned decisionmaking.

TURN therefore recommends that the

sentence that begins on line 5 and ends on line 6 of page 4
be stricken from the bill.
Subsection (d) simply adds a requirement that the
Commission serve its decision on all parties.
current practice.

This reflects

It also corresponds with TURN's comments

regarding subsection (a) to the extent that it clearly makes
the language applicable to cases other than complaints.
Subsection (e) makes no substantive changes to existing law.
Section 4 (pages 4-7).

This section of the bill would

establish ex parte contact restrictions.

TURN would favor a

disclosure-type ex parte rule, but does not favor an
outright ban.

We also strongly oppose criminal penalties

[Section 1705.5(d)J.
TURN agrees that the burden of reporting any contacts
should be on the Commissioner, because the important thing
is what the decisionmaker thought he heard, not what the
communicator thought he said.

If the burden is nonetheless

placed on the outside party, then the notice of ex parte
contact should be served on all parties, not just hidden
away in the Commission's files.
TURN agrees with the proposed Section 1705.5(a) (3),
regarding the treatment of commissioners' advisors.
Restrictions on staff personnel should go no farther than

7

this.

TURN opposes Section 1705.5(b), which would extend

the ex parte rule to ALJs.

There is no real or perceived

problem with the ALJs and ex parte contacts.

Further, the

penalties are actually more severe than for contacts with
commissioners, for no apparent reason.

Given the fine line

between prohibited substantive contacts and procedural ones
(which are often necessary with ALJs) TURN particularly
opposes the sanctions provision.
Subsection (c), which defines "adjudicatory
proceeding," is critical and yet unduly vague, because of
the reference to "other similar formal action."
Specifically, the definition would appear to cover most
commission-initiated investigations (OIIs), which often
incorporate evidentiary hearings before an ALJ.

TURN agrees

that such investigations should be covered, but the language
needs to be clear.

One reasonable option would be to apply

the ex parte rule in any proceeding in which an ALJ proposed
decision will be issued pursuant to Section 311 of the Code
(basically, all cases that go to hearing).

This would also

then cover the more unusual, but not unheard of, situation
where hearings are held in a rulemaking proceeding.

TURN

would favor such coverage.
If the concerns set forth above can be accommodated,
TURN would support SB. 1042, along with 1041.

8

In general, however, TURN supports the need for codifying
rules regarding ex parte contacts at the Commission.

As you

know, the Commission has proposed its own ex parte rule, and TURN
has concerns with that propsal as well.

Furthermore, while TURN

would like to believe that the Commission will follow through on
establishing an ex parte rule, past experience leads us to
believe that the Commission may not follow through.
Consequently, we believe a legislative remedy is in order.

9
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ALANJ.GARDNER
rice Presidenr/Regulatory Affairs

Mr. Paul Fadelli
Senate Energy & Public Utilities Committee
State Capitol, Room 2035
Sacramento, California 95814

RE:

CPUC REFORM BILL

Dear Paul:
Enclosed is a copy of the opinion in Camp Meeker Water System
Inc. vs. PUC decided by the California Supreme Court on November
15, 1990.
On pages 12976-7, you will see the court has decided and
discussed the scope of review on the factual basis of a
Commission decision.
This discussion clearly indicates that the
standard of review now existing in California is not what is
generally provided in the other 49 states. Rather, the standard
here is "whether the Commission has regularly pursued its
authority."
This means that even if the Legislature's reform bill grants
appellate review, such review would effectively be precluded.
The present standard of review means a Commision factual finding
would be insulated from review even if it was contrary to
overwhelming factual evidence in the record that would make the
finding "erroneous" in most of the jurisdictions.
We are not talking about a situation when there is real
substantive evidence introduced that is conflicting and upon
which the Commission then has the full right and duty to make a
choice or to meld its choice. What we are talking about is where
testimony is presented without any support or backup: for
instance in the recent depreciation proceedings, ORA candidly
admitted it had no studies or backup for its position, and it had
picked the mid-point between the two disputed figures with no
other justification. Under that circumstance, other states'
standards of appellate review would suggest a Commission decision
based on such "evidence" is "erroneous" and an unsupported
factual finding.
This does not mean the Commission could not
have chosen between the two principal parties' positions, but it

Serving Over 5,000,000 California Families

Mr. Paul Fadelli
December 19, 1990
Page two

does mean that in other states there would have had to be a
substantive basis for how the factual decision was made, and
supporting conclusions, if on cross-examination, the direct
testimony of one of the two parties had been impeached or
reasonably called into question.
Therefore, I suggest that as part of the appellate review section
of the reform bill that the standards for review of factual
evidence and conclusions be listed. While there are several
standards the Legislature might want to consider, we suggest the
"preponderance of the evidence" test is fair to both the
Commission and any parties who are disappointed in a factual
finding.
answer any questions, please give me a call.

Enclosure
cc:

Spencer R. Kaitz
Dennis Mangers

AJG:tmc
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ployees had no legal nght to retatn Chandler's keys
(Knighten v. Sam's Parking Valet, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 75-76}, we do agree that this case does not involve a negligent entrustment. The vehicle drtven by Chandler belonged to him, not to Saga or one of its employees. However,
plaintiff's lack of a cause of actiOn based on negligent en·
trustment cannot JUStify Saga's summary judgment, given
the Restatement Second of Torts section 324 A issue pre·
sented by plaintitrs oppositiOn to the motion for summary
JUdgment. Thus, Mcttelka is also of no value to Saga.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff has submttted evsdence to raise a triable
issue ofmatenal fact regardmg whether Saga's restaurant
and its patron, Chandler, had an arrangement or agreement on the mght of the accident to the effect that the restaurant employees would not give Chandler's keys back to
him if he were under the tntluence of alcohol. If such an arrangement existed, Saga may have liability to plaintiff
ba!>ed upon the pnnciples expressed in section 324A of the
Restatement Second of Torts. Therefore, the trial court
erred Jn awarding Saga a summary Judgment.

DISPOSITION

I
1

The judgment appealed from \S reversad and the cause
is remanded to the trial court w1th directions to vacate its
order granting Saga's motion for summary JUdgment and
conduct further proceedings In accordance with the views
expressed herem. Costs on appeal to plaintiff.

Tuesday,No'\lember20, l99t

sltion to a summary Judgment motion and 1ervei effectively as
declaration by Mr. Nolan, we trcatithereauuch.
4.ltis of no consequence whether the arrangement which pi air
tiff contends Chandler had with the employees at the restau!'llnt,
v1ewed as one made gratuitously by the restaurant or one in wluc
the consideration given by Chandler was his continued busine'
there.
5. The duty of a volunteer ends once he had performed his
untary act IAndrewa v. Wells (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 533, 541.) Thu
although, according lO Nolan, Saga's employees had previous'
held Chandler's keys for him, it is not those past acts that bring th·
case w1th Restatement Second section 324A. Rather, it is plaintiff
assertion that on the n1ght of the accident, the restaurant em~<lo·
ees took, apparently in accordance with an understanding or agre•
ment made with Chandler, and then returned biskeystohim.

6. The court in Knighten explained that although the valet ser
vice could have refused lO g1ve the keys back to the driver since ''A
citizens in California have the right to interfere with an attempt!
commit a crime. and drunk driving obviously is that [citation]," th
valet service did not have a to do so. (Knighten v. Sam's Parking
let, supra, 206 Cai.App.3d at pp. 75-76.) Quoting from another casE
the court said; "'As a general rule, one owes no duty to control tih
conduct of another.... · (Davidson v. City or Westminster 0982) 3
Cal.3d 197,203 .... ) Only a special relationship between the two par
t1cs, or between the one party and the potential victims of the other
creates such a duty. {Ibid.)" The Knighten court found no such spE
cia I relationshiP 1n the case before it. {I d. at pp. 73·'14.)
·

CROSKEY,J.
We concur:

KLEIN,P.J.
DANIELSON,J.

1 The 1978 amendment to secuon 1714 designated the original
text ofthat section as subdiVISIOn {a) and added the followmg proviSIOnS.
"(b) lt1s the intent of the Legtslature lO abrogate the holdings in
cases such as Yesf'ly v. Sager (5 Cal.3d 153). Bernhard v. Harrah's
Club( 16CaL3a 313). and Coulter v. SupcriorCourl!{2ljCal.3o [144))
and to remstate the prior JUdicial interpretation of this section as It
relates to proximate cause for IOJunes incurred as a result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an mtox•cated person, namely lhat
the furn1snmg of alcoholic beverages 1s not the proximate cause of
mJunes rcsultwg from 1ntox1cation, but rather the consumption of
olcoholic beverages 1s the proximate cause of injuries inflicted
upon another by an intOXICated person.
"(C) No soc1al host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any
person shall be held legall:; accountable for damages suffered by
such perscn, or for InJUry to the person or properly of, or death of,
any third p.;;r:on, resulting from the consumption of such beveragcs ...
The 1978 amendment to sectior, 25602 designated the origmal
text ofthatsection as subdiv1s1on {a) and added the followang proviSions.
"(b) No person who sells, furnsshes. gtves. or causes to be sold.
furn1shed, or g1ven away. any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdi·
vis1on !a) ofthi• secuon shall be csvilly liable to any InJured person
or the estate of such person for mjuries Inflicted on that person as a
result ofi nl<•xication by the consumer of such alcoholic beverage.
"(cl The [.eg1sJature hereby declares that th1s setuon shall be
Interpreted so that the holdings m cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5
Cui 3d 153l, D"rnhard v. llarrah's Club! 16 Cal.3d 313) and Coulter
v. Superior Court <21 Cal 3ci !44J be abrogated m fao;or ofpnor Jtu.liCial interpretation find mg the consumpt1o11 of a!roholic beverages
rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages a~ the proximate
cau~e or 1njunes 1nil ictcd upon another by an 1ntoxscated person."
2. The record does nol rcllect whether the trial court ruled ou
the ob)ecuons. However. that IS oi no consequence; we must deter·
mmc the validtty of those obJCCtiom ourselves smce our standard of
rcv1cw IS a de novo exammat10n of the order which granted the motion for summary Judgment. (Pril'c v Wells Fargo Bank (1989) 213
Cal App 3d 465. 474.)

3. Such testimony could not be rece1ved m thiS case over a hear·
say obJection on the ground that It IS admiSSible under the "former
testimony'' excepuon. Under Evidence Code section 1292, subdivi·
s1on <al.lt IS requtred that the dcclarant(l.e .. Mr. Nolan) be unavail·
able as a witness. No such showmg 1s made here. However, inasmuch as the recorded testimony was offered in supportofthe oppo·

REAL PROPERTY
Regulated Utility Has Easement
For Water Resource Development
Citcas90DailyJournal D.A.R.l2972

CAMP MEEKER WATER SYSTEM, INC.,
Petitioner,

v.
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION,
Respondent;

CAMP MEEKER RECREATION AND PARK DISTRICT,
Real Party in Interest.
No. S012916
Cali forma Supreme Court
Filed November 15,1990
We are asked to determme whether, pursuant to art1
cle Xll of the Californta Constitution or legislative enact·
ment. the Public Utilities Commisston (commissiOn) has)unsdiction to adjudicate mtercsts In real property, and,
so, the effect of such adJudication on the interests of
sons who are not regulated utilities in that property.
lioner Camp Meeker Water System, Inc. (CMWSl}, a regulated utility, also challenges, as unsupported by the evidence, the finding and conclusion of the commission that
CMWSI is the holder of an extensive easement for water resource development and exploitation in lands in which it
does not claJm an interest and to .which it does not hold ti·
tie.
On exammation of the record it appears that, in the ex·
ercise of its ratemaking authority, the commisswn has
done no more than construe deeds conveying real property
and easements to petitioner and its predecessor. It has
done so in the same manner that a court or agency con·
strucs any written instrument (see Civ. Code,§ 1066 et seq.;

ij

!
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I

Tuesday, November20,1990

ilnity .Appellate lltpurt

Code Civ. Proc.-, U 1857, 2077) for the purpose of ascertain·
ing facts relevant to the me1it.s of the application for in·
creased rates, not for the purpose of resolving disputes be·
tween parties claim in& ri&ht.s under the deed or to enforce
rights conveyCd by those deeds. The commission acknowledges lhatitdocs noth;lvejurisdiclion equivalent to that of
a court, to adjudicate incidont.softiUe, and that ll would be
bound by a judicial ruling in a quictlille action brought by
any person claiming an interest in the subject property
who believes the commission rutin& clouds h1s lillo. (Code
Civ. Proc.• §.760.010 etscq.)
The only issues properly before us in lhis proceeding,
there tore, arc whether the evidence supports the commission's construction of the deeds in issue, and 1ts deciSion,
based on that construction, to deny in part petitioner's application for a rate increase. In undertaking that review
lhis cou1·t is limited to determining if the commission has
regularly pursued its authority. Factual findings of lhe
commission arc not reviewable unless a petitioner asserts
that the peUtioner's constitutional rights have been viol at·
ed. <Pub. Util. Code,§§ 1757,1760.)1 SinceCMWSI makes no
such claim. and there is evidence to support the commis·
sion decision. we shall atnrm.

I
This dispute arises in majorpartbccauscwclls located
on a 16-acrc parcel orland owned by CMWSI no longer supply water to the system which serves approximately 350
customers in or ncar lhc Sonoma County community of
Camp Meeker. Wells on an adjacent parcel, the
"Cbcnowclh parcel," which is a watershed for the CMWSI
land, currcnUy supply approximately half of the water
needed by the utility. CMWSI is wholly owned by members
ofthe Chenoweth family, who arc also the record title owners of the Chenoweth parcel. The CMWSI and Chenoweth
parcels were conveyed to the Chenowcths in 1951 by mem·
bers of the Meeker family who then owned and operated
lhc Camp Meeker Water System <CMWS). The Chenowcths
incorporated the utility in 1959.
In November 1983. CMWSI sought a rate increase
ba:;cd on a claim that in order to meet the needs of iUi custotnei'S for water CMWSI would have to lease additional
wells on the Chenoweth parcel. Aficr extended hc•u·tngs,
and rehearing. in decision No. 89-10-033, the commrss10n
concluded that CMWSI owns an cascmenllh<tt permits ilto
obtain water from the enUre 600·acrc Chc;noweth Wittershed, ilOd therefore is not obligated to compensate the Chcnowelhs for its exercise of that ca~cmcnt, or to pass on the
cost of future well site usc lo the ratepayers.
Thts proceeding arises on the petition ofCMWSI for 1·evicw of that decision. As we have noted, and will cxplam in
greater detail below. lhc commtssion decision construed
two 1951 deeds. the lirstofwhich conveyed CMWS, the six·
teen-acre parcel ofland on which the water systmn is toe at·
(:d, <llld the easements in issue here to the Chcnowcths. The
second conveyed the lands making up the 600-acrc parcel
to the Chcnowcths and again conveyed to them property
ownt•d by CMWS. The t·ommission found that the first of
the~c deeds conveyed an casement for water rights on the
adJacent 600-acre Chenoweth parcel which the grantors
had nol yeltransfcn·cd to the Chcnowelhs. Biiscd on that
t·onstruction 1tordcred:
l. CMWSI to enforce those water rights against the
record titleholders;
2. CMWSI to record a notice of intent to preserve 1ts
easements pursuant to Civil Code section 877.060; 2
3. The commission's Advisory and Compliance Divi·
SIOiltO intervene in proceedings before the Stale Water Resources Control Boilfd lo prevent the record titleholders of
thl' Chenoweth parcel from obtaining rights inconsistent
wtth those held byCMWSl under its casement;
4. The Advi:;ory and Comf,lliance Division to forward
cotlics of the decision to title insurance companies and
take other steps to ensure that any future purchaser ofthc
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burdened 600-acrc property would have actual notice of
the casement.
The commission, relying on cases decided under Code
or Civil Procedure secUon 902, opposed issuance of t.llc
wntofrevicwon the ground thalCMWSI was nota party aggncvcd by tts decision. The right to petition this court for
n'v1cw of a decision of the commission is governed by secllonl756. however. Thul section expressly authori2es a pc·
l!ltOil by an applicant for I'ChCal'ing before the COmmission.
Nonetheless. because CMWSl benefits from the commis·
>lOll ruling that il holds casements In the Chenoweth par.
eel, 1Ls stilnding lo complam that the factual findings underlying the decision arc erroneous extends only to the impm:l of that decision on its application for a rate increase.
The jumdictional claim, and the related assertion that by
dcl<'rmining CMWSl's interests in the Chenoweth parcel
the rommiss1on denied due process to members ofthe Che·
nowrth family who are record titleholders, will not be conS!dered.3
Because the commission regularly pursued its authority In reaching its decision, the only issue to be addressed is
CMWSI's claim that the commission's finding that CMWSl
owns rights to substantially all, if not all, wells, stored surface water, and surface runoff ortile Chenoweth parcel, is
not supported by lhe evidence.

u
PROCEDURAlJEVIDENTIARY HISTORY
CMWSI nlcd its application for authority to increase
revenues from $34,200 to $53,800 (a 57.3 percent increase)
on November 13, 1983. A 12.74 percent offset increase was
authorized by resolution on November 22, 1983, after
which hearings were held addressed to the balance of the
requested increase, an end to an existing moratorium on
new conneclions, and a 6.5 percent attrition increase. On
September 19, 1984,thc eommissiongranted an increase of
19.46 percent. continued the ban on new connections,
gnmled attrilion increases, and found:
"11. Members oflhc Meeker family, original owners of
the water system at Camp Meeker, executed a deed conveyin~( all but approximately 16acrcs ofthc land on which the
water system was located to members of the Cl)enoweth
r;unily on Novcmbe1· 29. 1951, without commission au tho·
nzation.
"12. The question of fact as to whether the property deseethed 10 lhc Meeker deed of November 29, 1951 con·
unncd only private nonulility property and no public uti I·
ity water resources has not bcqn presented to the Cpmmis·
s1on for its determination.''
·
The commisst'on then concluded:
..The deed from lhc Sonoma County Land Title Com·
pany to Hardin T. Chenoweth. William C. Chenoweth, and
L. C. Chenoweth dated November 29. 1951 is void for want
orauthori2alion by the Commission. "1
Hehcarmg was granted on February 6, 1985,1imited to
treatment of the Chenoweth parcel. Two years of unsuc·
ccssful negotiations between the owners ofthat parcel and
the commission's Division of Ratepayers' Advocates
{DItA). cnsuc.d. Resumption of evidentiary hearings before
the administrative law judge <AWl were delayed until January 1988. by the death of William Chenoweth. president of
CMWSI.
Al the hearings a reprcscnt.at1ve ofDRA testified. DRA
recommended that the commission declare the Chc·
nowcth parcel. on which the several wells sought to be
leit5Cd by CMWSI were located. to be public utility prop·
erty used and useful in the public utility watc1· service of
CMWSI. That recommendation became the central issue in
the h<'in·ings. The DUA reprcsenta.livc testified that he be·
lievcd CMWSI was entitled to water from lllc Chenoweth
parcel. bul conceded that he had nol found recorded cvi·
<lcll('l' to support his conclusion lhal the well sites 011 the
Chl'IIOW<'lh puree! had been dedicated to public utility usc.
CM W~l oll'<.'l'ed documentary evidence daling back to 1932

-
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to support Jts claim that the Meeker family had seireiated
the family and utility propemes.
Among those documents was a summary of evidence
made by the commiSSIOn stalfin 1932 in conjunction w1th a
CMWS rate jncrease request. That summary mcluded a
cost estimate of the value of lands reserved for spnngs and
water tank sJtes. apparently refemng to sites on the Chenoweth parcel. Reference was also made to an expense
item for taxes, part of which was determmed to be chargeable to the applicants' pnvate realty holdings.
Other documents irom the 1932 rate proceedings included a land and nght-of-way appraisal exhibit prepared
by the commission staff which ret1ected an Inventory of 11
parcels or lots owned by CMWS, the total acreage of which
was 15.75 acres. No properties other than those parcels
which contained spnngs,d1vers10ns. or tanks actually used
or proposed for utdtty servtce were ident.ified in that inventory.
·A ledger sheet from the 1935 records of the Sonoma
County Tax Collector Identified 21 properties as associated w1th CMWS, but those parcels did not conform in all
respects to the commiSSIOn's 1932 inventory. An inventory
of the estate of Efl1e M. Meeker, who died intestate in 1940,
was filed in 1941. That wventory listed her interest in
"Camp Meel<er Water System lo\.S" whose descriptions,
with a smgle exception, corresponded to the lots listed as
associated with CMWS m the 1935 records of the tax collector. A handwritten annotation m the margin recited:
·'Appraised as part of water system." Other lots in the estate's wventory did not appear on the tax collector's list
and were not among CMWS properties. The appraisal of
the estate's real property valued the properties of CMWS
separately.
In 1951 the estate of Effie Meeker agreed to sell to Hardin T. Chenoweth, and h1s sons, William C. and L. C. Chenoweth, 14 of the 17 distributive interests in the estate.s
The estate contracted to sell those interests ln:
''(1] all of the property owned by said Meeker Estate located in the County of Sonoma ... , (2] together with the
Camp Meeker Water System, and all other property both
real and personal appurtenant to said system and used
therefor, [3) together with all moneys m bank in the name of
said Camp Meeker Water System, and all outstandmg receivables of the sa1d Camp Meeker Water System."
The agreement provided that "[t]he property herein
referred to and descnbed as the Camp Meeker property
generally consists of [1) approximately 800 acres of land
more or less located as aforesaid, (2] the Camp Meeker Water System, and [3] the inventory of personal properties, together with the cash in bank in the name of said Camp
Meeker Water System, and the accou11ts rcceivaoie. ·•
The agreement also prOVided that the administratrices
would cooperate in obtaming the approval of the commisSion for the transfer ofCMWS, on which the agreement was
conditioned, and, that: "It is fully understood and agreed
by and between the parties hereto that the [administratnces] have not ;omed m or been a party to the dedication
of any ofsa1d property herem referred to for the purpose of
the operation of the Camp Meeker Water System other
than the acreage cons1stmg of 14 acres ;nore or less Immediately surroundmg the vanous springs now used in the operatiOn ofthe Camp Meeker Water System."
On October 10. 1951, the administratrices, the Chenoweths, and Paul R Edwards. who held a one-third interest 1n the estate, sought. and on November 6, 1951, the commiSSion granted, aulhonty for the tr. :1;fcr ofCMWS to the
Chcnoweths. The commiSSion opinion acknowledged that
the estate was transfernng properties other than its interest 1n CMWS, and noted that of the $24,880.28 purchase
pnce. $8,500 had been assigned to CMWS, and the balance
to "certain non"Operative lands." The opmion also noted
that the purchasers Intended to acquire the remaimng interests in the estate "to the end that they will have entire
ownership of the water system propert1es."
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Of particular 1m portance m the
November 26, 1951, and November 29,
which the properties were
to
The first deed, executed on Noveln!l!~r
[italics added]:
" ... all of the right,
ors that certain
ma, State of California,
generally
Meeker Water System, including all
ered or on the surface, used and
water to customers of said System,
all
facilities of every kind and character used
operation of said System, and also aU
cs, and easements had, used, and
of said
and also ali water and
nant to said system and used and
and also all tanks, reservoirs,
and ditches leading thereto
''All real
... used in connection
Meeker Water
a public utility,
lowing parcels
property
totallingjustover fifteen acres, ten
"Together with any and aU other
or heretofore- used as springs, rel;ervmrs
connection with sa1d CamoMeeker
utility."(ltalicsadded.) ·
The concluding paragraphs
in conJUnction wtth the sale
-sellers were conveying all water
purtenant to the property used by
"Together with
water and water rights
to and belonging to the above descnbed land, and
es, pipes, and improvements, and all rights,
easements belongmg thereto or commonly
enjoyed therewith, together with all ofthe ne•><SO:!Ia!
erty used in the conduct and operation
Meeker Water System and owned in common by
grantors herein.
·
It is the intent and purpose ofthis Deed and nsl:rum~m
of transfer to convey not only the properties
described herein, but also all rights,lll:u!l!!ntll'!~~t£.
leges and facilities appurtenant to said
ter System and commonly used,
and enul.'li'!ill
maintenance and operation thereof, wheU1er exorE~sslv
scnbed herein or not, and this deed shall
as to accomplish such purpose." (Italics added.)
The second deed, executed on
veyed to the Chenoweths five specifically
"Highland Farms" parcels comprising48.4
eels subtitled "Timberland and acreage,"
was the north one-half of the
t10n 27 "except portions heretofore conveyed,
ing Camp Meeker Wate1· System lots"; lots in five
sions of the Camp Meeker area subtitled
lands''.; and under the subtitle "Camp Meeker
tem," two categories of property:
l. "All parcels of land standing
Meeker WaterSvstem. a Public utili tv.
· 2. "Church, Camp Meeker Store,
buildmg, library and water building sites.

''
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specifically described In the earlier deed would be conveyed.
Hitchcock also stated that CMWS bad been recogmzed
as a public utility by the California Railroad Commission,
the predecessor to the present commission, and was such
al the time of its acquisition by the Chenoweths. The term
··used and useful" in the November 26, 1951, deed was intended by both the grantees and grantors to include pipes,
connections and facilities; the term ''water and water
nghts" appurtenant to the system and useful in 1ts operalion was intended to include only the water, water nghts,
priv lieges, and easements on property owned by CMWS as
described in that deed.
Hitchcock had mqu1red, prior to the purchase of the
system by the Chen~weths, if any watershed other than
those in the acreage expressly owned by CMWS had been
dedicated for water supply purposes to the ut11i ty. At an ensuing meeting with commission staff member Coleman,
Hitchcock was told by Coleman that he had no knowledge
of any watersheds or lands encumbered, encroached upon,
or dedicated to serve CMWS for the purpose of securmg a
cater supply other than the acreage expressly owned by
CMWS. Coleman represented that ifthere were such rights
he would be aware of them. The November 26, 1951, deed
was prepared for the grantors and grantees with this understanding and with the intent that it be interpreted con·
sistenUy with Coleman's representations.
Finally, Hitchcock declared that CMWS and the propea1.y it owned at ali times had been treated by the grantors
as distinct and separate from that other property which
they owned and conveyed to the Chenoweths. The deed of
November 26,1951, pertained only to properties owned by
CMWS and those properties were described in that deed.
No other properties owned by the grantors were intended
to be impressed with a watershed easement for the benefit
ofCMWS.
Based on this evidence, the ALI concluded thatCMWSI
had no easement rights over the Chenoweth parcel. He reasoned that the language of the November 26, 1951, deed
was not ambtguous and could not be interpreted to convey
nghts in the surrounding lands, and was consistent with
the intentions ofthe parties as expressed in the 1951 agree·
menL
Thus, the surrounding lands, including the well sites
developed by the Chenoweths and leased to CMWS1 were
not dedicated to public utility water service.
The commtsston reached a contrary conclusion in its
October 12, 1989, decision. 7 That decision. like the proposed decisiOn of the ALJ, concluded that the 1951 convey·
anccs to the Chenoweths were proper since they repre·
sen ted a commonly understood segregation of the Meeker
property between public utility and private property for
tax and ratemaking purposes. 8 The commission also con·
eluded that the November 26, 1951, deed conveyed the
CMWS real estate and all water rights, easements and priv·
tlegcs appurtenant thereto. The November 29, 1951, deed
conveyed the remaimng Meeker land.
Unlike the AI...J, however, the commis-sion concluded
that while the property conveyed by the November 29,
1951, deed was th~ pnvate real estate ofthe Chenowcths, it
was: "subject to the public utility water rights, easements
and privilegesgrar.ted by the November26, 1951 deed.
"The rights g1ven to CMWS by the November 26, 1951
deed (and subsequently given to Camp Meeker Water System, Incorporated (CMWSl) by the August 7, 1959 deed\~ allow the utility to explore for and develop public ut11ity water sources on the Chenoweth land, and to take such ac·
tions as may be necessary to ensure that the Chenoweths do
not jeopardize the ability of the water system to meet its
public utility obligations. TheChenoweths are free, howev·
er, to use the1r land as they see fit so long as that use is consistent w1th the utility's rights and easements."
The comm1ssion reasoned that the Meekers as owners
ofCMWS did not have a formal casement over the nonoper-
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commission applied Civil
case law requir·
conveyed, the rela""'""''rtv owned by the reascmame contemplation of
were to be.
of Los Angeles U967) 67
n"'""""' (1950) 35 Cal.2d 5, 10;
........ ".uu . .>u 561, 569; and George
861·862.) Based
res1S011ed that could interpret
the water company
"'"'"''"''""'"rights. The language
1951,
commission conclud"broad rights
wat{.lr from the
ed, conveyed to
land subject to the easements.
These rights were not limited to use of the wells or water sources from which CMWSI
water in 1951 when
and diversions
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Petitioner assumes that the commiSSion has under·
taken to adjudicate Incidents of title, and has adjudicated
the rights of third parties agamst the public utility. It argues on that basis that the commiSSion has exceeded its au·
thority and has taken, on behalf of the utility, property
owned by the third part1es wtthoutcompensation.
As noted earlier, however, the commtssion makes no
cla1m to have such JUrisdiction. Rather. 1t purports only to
have construed the ex1stmg legal rights ofCMWSI, and disclaims any power to create new nghts. The commission ex·
pressly recogn1zes that its functions do not include deter·
mmtng the validity of contracts, whether claims may be as·
serted under a contract, or interests m or title to property,
those being questions for the courts. (Hanlon v. Eshleman
(1915) 169 Cal. 200. See also C.B. Lee (1939) 42 C.R.C. 41.) It
claims only the power to construe, for purposes of exercis·
ing•its regulatory and ratemakmg authority, the existing
nghts of a regulated utility.
In construmg the 1951 deeds for that purposa, the com·
m1ss1on acted within tts constitutional and statutory juris·
diction.
"PI'ivate corporations and persons that own, operate,
control, or manage a ... system for the ... furnishing of ...
water ... are public utilities subject to control by the Legis·
lature." <Cal. Const., art. XII,§ 3.) The commission may,
pursuant to the grant of authority found m article XII, sec·
tJOn 2 of the Caltfornta Constitution "(s]ubject to statute
and due process ... establish its own procedures." And,
pursuant to article X11. section 5, "[t)he Legislature has
plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of this
constitution, but consistent with this article, to confer ad·
d1t1onal authority and jurisdiction upon the commission, ..
In lhe exercise of its plenary power the Legislature has
provtded that all charges by a public utility for commodi·
ties or services rendered shall be just and reasonable(§
451) and has gtven the comm1sston the power and obligatton todetermme not only that any rate or mcrease in a rate
;; JUSt and reasonable <§§ 454, 728), but also authority to
··supervise and regulate every public utility in the State
and [to] do all thmgs, whether specifically designated ln
this part or m addition thereto, which are necessary and
conven1ent 1n the exerc1se of such power and jurisdic·
tion." (§ 701.)
In regulatmg a public utility the comm1ssion may de·
term me the facilities, service, and method of service in order to ensure that the service provided is adequate(§ 761),
and 1n aid thereof may order that the utility extend or im·
prove 1ts physical facilities or properties (§ 762.)
Further, a public utility may not dispose of any property necessary and useful in the performance of its dutirlS
Without authorization by the commission. (§ 851.) While
th1s section ts most often applied to outright transfers of
property, read together w1th the above sections which authonze the commiSSIOn to require that a utility ensure its
ab11Jty to prov1de adequate service, it unqueEtionably per;nits the commiSSion to prevent disposal of such property
by 1nd1rection, as by failure to exercise or safeguard rights
possessed by the utility. (Civ. Code,§ 811, subds. 3 & 4. See
also. Crum v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp. (1934) 220 Cal. 295,
309-310.)
Therefore, constructiOn of the November 26, 1951,
deed in reference to the transfer of the appurtenant Cnenoweth parcel in order to determme CMWSI's rights to
sources of water on the Chenoweth parcel was a necessary
incident to the commission's consideration ofCMWSI's application for an increase 10 its charges. The commission
was obligated to determ1ne if the claimed expense for leas·
mg wells on the Chenoweth parcel was justified, and to en·
sure that CMWSI did not abandon or otherwise dispose of
property 1n the form of easement rights necessary and use·
v

·--

sian's factual
and conclusions are
decision, fUrther review
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...,._... ~....- . 41 Ca.l.2d 354, · erty of the person whose estate transferred in the same
tbewttptto
manner and to the same
as sucb property was obvi·
9ftbe
ously and permanently used
the
whose estate is
commissioa.
t~~B~IIAWIIII (1J'7t)
transferred, for the
at the
when tile
transfer was
Code, §
23 Cal.3d 638.) . .
While s~!itiot J'78Ct ~- ~ tbt. power to exer- 1104.) "The extent of a servitude determined by the
terms of the
or the nature ofthe enjoyment by which
cise its independe&ltj~J·~-.~e ia~J aDd the facts if an
1t was acquired.
800.) ltma:v reasonably be inorder or decision· of Ule .ccquwaion is ehaUeneed on
granted in
grounds that it violata &at flllderal constitutional rights of ferred, therefore, that the
the November26, l95l, deed burdened
retained propthe petitioner, no claim to which section 1760 applies is
properly before u. ·
erty of tile grantor, the 600-acre
retained by the
Meeker estate. 17 When the 600-acre parcel was conveyed
CMWSl does aque that the commiuion lacks jurisdic·
by the November 29, 1951, deed, it continued to be the ser·
tlon to determine thl,'.ri&hts of third parties, a due process·
v1ent tenement.
based claim, or~te private property without compensation, a claim pmu{llably founded in tbe Fifth and Four3 The E:dent oft he Euement.
.
teenth Amendments to the Unitllld States Constitution. We
Because the November 26, 1951, deed expressly
have concluded above, however, that the comm1sston has
granted an easement over the Chenoweth property it is not
not purported to affect title or create interests in CMWSI
necessary to find an easement
implication, and the
and has done nothina more than construe the 1951 deeds
section 1104 to uses in
for purposes ofratemaldna only.
existence at the time of the agreement andior conveyance.
More imponantly, however, the decision that CMWSl
The well-established law governing easements by implica,
holds an easement over the Chenoweth parcel is one favor·
tion is instructive, however, when the deed does not de·
scrsbe the e:dentofthe easement it conveys.
able to CMWSI, which does not claim that the decision vio·
In Fristoe v.
lates rights it has as the petitioner. The sole question,
supra, 35 Cal.2d 5, 9·10, we ac·
therefore, is whether there is an evidentiary basis in the
cepted the rule as set
the Restatement of Property:
record for the commission's conclusion that the November
"'The extent ofan
is to be
26, 1951, deed conveyed an easement for water developinferred from the circumstances which
at the time of
ments on the Chenoweth parcel to CMSWI. There is.
the conveyance and give rise to the
Among
B. Evidence Supporting the Decision.
these circumstances is the use which is
made of the
l.TheDeed.
dominant tenement at that time. Yet it does
follow that
The November 26, 1951, deed expressly conveyed to
the use authorized is to be
to
use as was re·
CMWSI all of the grantor's interest in CMWS and all
quired by the dominant
at that time. It is to be
"easements had, used, and enjoyed in the operation of said
measured rather such uses
parties might reason·
System, and also all water and water rights appurtenant to
ably have
from
uses of the dominant
said System and used or useful in its operation."
tenement.
the
reasonably have exIt is axiomatic, as the commission recognized, that an
circumstances exist·
pected is
easement conveys rights in or over the land of another. "An
ing at the
of the conveyance. It is to be assumed that
ease men~ involves primarily the privilege of doing a cer·
they anticipated such uses as
tain act on, or to the detriment of, another's property. To
quired
a normal de\•el!l~Dm
the creation of an appurtenant easement, two tenements
ment ...
are necessary, a dommantone in favor of which the obliga·
cordingly, in
lion exists, and a servient one upon which the obligation
extent of the grantee's
rests." (Wright v. Best (1942) 19 Cal.2d 368, 381. See also,
notonlyto the actual
Los Angeles etc. Co. v. S.P.R.R. Co. (1902) 136Cal. 36, 48.)
erance, but also to such
facts and circumstances
The 16-acre parcel and the Chenoweth parcel had, \ln·
show were within the reasQ!'lable contemplation of the partil the November 26, 1951, conveyance, been in the same
lies at the time of the conveyance."
ownership, notwithstanding the Meekers' separate treat·
This rule
applies to express easements
ment of the
for tax and other recordkeeping pur·
when the extent of the easement
question. "The effect
poses. That
so, the deed cannot reasonably be con
ofsection 806 ofthe Civil
is to establish intent as the
strued as either creatmg or conveying a then-existing easecriterion for determining the 'extent of a servitude,' and
ment burdening the 16·acre parcel. The only theory on
this is in accord with the rationale of the rules governing
which such a conveyance might be premised, revivo:l of sm
easements by implication. (Fristoe Drapeau, 35 Cal.2d 5,
easemellt existing pr1or to merger ofthe dominant and ser·
9 )" (M<~sier v. Mead (1955) 45 Ca!.2d 629, 633.) The rule is
vient estates (iee Civ. Code,§ 811, subd. 1; Dixon v. Scher·
tempered, of course, by the limitation that if an "easement
meier (1805) 110 Cal. 582, 585; 28 Ca!.Jur.3d (rev.) Easeis founded upon a
. , only those interests expressed
p. 188), is unsupported by any evidence that
ml!nts, §
in the grant and
incident thereto pass
such ease lent existed prior to the acquisition oftille to the
from the owner ofthe fee.
general rule is clearly estab·
p1·operties by the Meeker family. The deed therefore ere·
lished that, despite the
easement, the owner
atcd an easement under which the CMWS-property beof the servient tenement may make any use ofthe land that
came the dominant tenement, holding an easement appur·
does not interfere unreasonably w11.h the easement. "(Pas·
adena v.
etc,
supra, 17 CaL2d 576,
tenant to that land over property in the possession ofanoth·
579.)
er16
The lang-uage of the November 26, 1951, deed therefore
There is evidence in th~
to support the finding
of the commission that the easement granted by the Nosupports the commission finding that tile deed conveyed
an easement over lands appurtenent to CMWS and its 16'lember 26, 1951, deed permits CMWSI to exploit any and
all &ourcesofwateron the Chenoweth parcel. The deed did
acre parceL
not restrict CMWS to use ofthe wells or springs existing at
·~-- 2. The Burdened Property.
the lime ofthe conveyance. Rather, the grant mcluded "all
There 1s also a basis in the evtdence for tile findings
and conclusion of the commission that the easement conwater rights appurtenant to said System and used or useful
veyed was, by implication, a burden on the Chenoweth par·
in ii.S operation" and "whether
described ... or
eel. It is not necessary to its validity that the conveyance of
noL" (Italics added.) The
reasonably in·
an express easement identify the servient tenement. The
fer from this
in which the
law
that a conveyance of real property creates in
conveyance was
that the easement permits CMWSI
favor
property "an easement 1.0 use other real propto use any water sources necessary to replace springs that
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<;a!. 734. 739.) Therefore.
are no longer adequate and to develop water sources
needed to meet the demands created by "normal develop· ·, subJeCt to relitigation 111 all¥ court of 1•111
m!ne these inU:rests.
.
ment of the dommant tenement." (Fristoe v. Drapeau, su·
pra,35Cal.2d 5, 9.)
The commissions construction of the easement is con·
s1stent with and supported by the assumption that an ex·
press easement is mtended to accommodate future needs.
(Fa us v. City ofLos Angeles, supra,67 Cal.2d 350,355.)
4. Relevance of Separate Transfer of Chenoweth Par•
eel.
·
Petitioner claims alternatively that the two deeds in
question conclusively establish that the Chenoweth parcel
IS not useful or necessary.
Petitioner's argument is based on the stipulation in
5. The actinlllldministratrices had at that time obtained
sectiOn 851 that. "any d1spos1t10n of property by a public
mentonly from the holders ofthose interests.
utility shall be conclusively presumed to be of property
which IS not useful or necessary 10 the performance of its
dut1es to the public. as to any purchaser, lessee, or encumbrancer dealing with such property m good faith for value;.
" Petitioner reasons that the commission's approval of
the sale of the 16-acre parcel separately from the Che·
noweth parcel established that the latter was not useful or
necessary for pub! ic benefit.
Ourconc!us10r., that there IS an .ovidentiarybasis in the
record for the comm1sswn's conclusiOn that the November
26. 1951. deed conveyed to CMWSI an easement for the de·
velopmcnt and explottation of such water nghts as are
needed to adequately service CMWSI's customers, an;wers that contention.
Inasmuch as the November 26, 1951, conveyance in·
eluded an easement for water r1ghts 1n the Chenoweth par·
eel. the commiSSIOn cannot be deemed to have determined
that this parcel was not useful to CMWS. To the contrary,
the manner in which the sale was structured preserved for
the utility a "useful" interest 1n that property, an easement
that IS "necessary in the performance of[CMWSI's) duties
to the public. " 18
The decisiOn 1s therefore supported by evidence in the
1 ecord. The inferences drawn from that evidence are reasonable. The findings and conclusions are not subject to
further rev1ew. The commiSSIOn did not err in determining
the legal significance of its findings m construmg the November 26,1951, deed.

y

Commission declSlon No. 89-10-033 is affirmed.
EAGLESONJ.

We concur:
LUCAS,C.J.
:\IOSK,J.
BROUSSARD,J
PANELLl,J.
KENNARD,J.
ARABIAN,J.

of the grantee,
grant by a public
or body, as
interpreted in favorofthegrantor."

1 All further-references to code sectiOns herein are to the Pub·
ltc Uttlities Code unless otherwtse Indicated.
2. Civil Code section 877060, subdivision (aJ: "The owner of an
easement may at any ume record 4 notice of Intent to preserve the
easemenl"
3. Those claims, whtch attempt to assert the rights of other partie>. assume that the commiSSIOn decision has 1;;~JUdicata effect
and may be btnd1ng m future ratemaktng or JUdlcJal proceedings.
Pursuant to >tCtJOn 1709, the cornmtsston deCision·· that CM·
WSlts not presently ent•tlcd to a rate increase·· JS binding as, "[ijn
all collateral act1ons or procecdmgs, the orders and deCISIOns oftho:
commtsston wh1ch have become nnal shall be conclusive." The
P•lbllc Ut1lit1es Code does not give the ruling any greater. effect
Th 1s court has recognized that when the commissiOn exercises tl~
JUdicial power, 1ts orders or deCISIOns have "the conclustve etrectol
res Judicata as to the 1ssues Involved where they are agam brought
1nto question 10 subsequent proceedmgs between the same parlies.· !People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 630.)
However. the commission exerctses 1ts legislative power, not its JU·
d1c1al power, when 1t nxes rates (People v. Western Airlines, Inc.,
42 Cal.2d 621, 630; Southern Pacific Co. v. Railroad Com. (1924) 194

were aware of this order when
knewoffindings in
spring sources and supplies was
vice. The only such earlier proceeding to
reference
made by the commission took
m Hl32. The commission
sian does not further explam
relevance ofthe findings
that year or a fits conclusion that the Meekers were aware
cessity that resources on the segregated private real estate
of the Meeker.; be developed.
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17. There is no evidence in the rec:on1, and no party hu suuest·
ed, that CMWS or the Meek~r~r 11mlly held utility easements over
land owned by customen of the utility. <See, e.c., Pasadena v. Call·
fornia·Mlchlaan etc. Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 576.) A reasonable inference, therefore. is that thearanton intended to convey an easement
over Ole 600-ac:re parcel they retained.

18. Bued in part on ita uaumption that tile commtuton dec!·
sion was intended to acijudicate the Incidents of title to tile Che·
noweth parcel, ralher than consll\le the deed to the 16 acre parcel
now owned by CMWSI, petitioner auerta the commtuton proce·
durca were irre&lllar beeauae the iuu.e of ownenhip of Chenoweth
parcel waa not properly before it and the recon1 owners of that par·
eel were notciven noUce. They alaoaeektoau.pport thi5 challence to
the procedure with a claim that the 1951 proceedinc in which the
commission authorized the aale of the uUiil)' was conclusive. Our
conclusion that the commluion properly conatrued the November
2Jl,l!l51, dee~. and purporte<1todo nothinc more, maku itu.nneces·
sary to addreulhisclalm fUrther.
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The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether a resh·
tution fine of $10,000 should be stricken because the trial
court failed to advise appellant of the ime prior to acceptm~: his plea of no contest. We conclude that although appellanthas failed to show that he was prejudiced by the court's
failure to so advise, he must be eiven the opportunity to
withdraw his plea.
FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND
Appellant was the purchasing manager for the
biochemistry and biophysics-departments of the Univer·
sity t>f California at San Francisco. Utilizing his own out·
side company, appellant engaged in a number of t'raudu·
lent sales to the .. umversity which were accomplished by
means of appellant's position as purchasing manager.
Prior to the preliminary hearing, appellant pleaded no
contest to the charge that he misappropriated over
$300,000 in state funds over a period of 10 years while employed by the univ.li·ilit,y. (Pen. Code, f 424, subd. (1),) He
also admitted the special allegation that the amount taken
was over $100,000 thereby exposing himself to an addi·
tiona I two-year term. (Pen. Code,§ 12022.6, subd. (b).)
Prior to entering this plea, appellant was advised of
and waived his constitutional righ~ 1 After he was advised
of the range of punishment for the
of the applicable parole period, and the consequences
revocation of
parole, appellant entered a
of no contest to all charg·
es. This plea was "open
court" and was not the result
of negotiations with the prosecutor; however, the sentencing judge had indicated that a two-year prison term appeared to be an appropriate disposition. The requirement
of a restitution fine was not mentioned.
Even though this was not a negotiated plea, appellant
was advised that his plea was not binding on the court and,
if the sentencing judge withdrew his approval of the indi·
cated disposition, he would be allowed to withdraw his

~-

'

Appellant was thereafter sentenced to the mitigated
term oftwo years in prison for the reason that he acknowl·
edged his guilt at an early stage in the proceedings. A twoyear term for the special allegation was imposed but stayed
because of appellant's lack of a prior criminal record. The
court also imposed a restitution fine of$10,000, as required
by Government Code section 13967, subdivision (c). Appel!antdu:! notobjectto the fine at the time of sentencing.
DISCUSSION
This appeal is taken only from the sentence. Appellant
does not challenge the validity of his plea of no contest.
Since the restitution fine was a direct consequence of the
plea, appellant should have been informed of the possibil·
of his plea. Appellant, having
ity of a fine prwr to
served a substantial
of his sentence, asks that the
tine be strtcken. 2
The improper imposition of a restitution fine can re·
suit fl'om twa distmct situations. Thus, a fine may exceed
lhe permissible punishment allowed by the terms of a ne·
gotlated disposition, or 1t may have been imposed after a
failure to advise the defendant that the fine was a consequence of a guilty plea. (People v. Davis {1988} 205
Cai.App.3d 1305, 1308-1310.) In cases involving breach of
the terms of a plea bargain, constitutional issues of due
process are ra1sed. and the bargain may be enforced or the
plea may be withdrawn depending on the facts of the case.
(People v. Mancbeno (1982) 32 CaL 3d 855, 860-861.) In such
situations, waiver ts not presumed from a failure to object
at the t1mc of sentencing. (I d. at p. 864; but see People v.
Davis, supra, 205 CaLApp.3d 1305; People v. Melton (1990)
218 CaLApp.3d 1406.) Also, the harmless error test of People v: Watson (1956}46 Ca!.2d
836, is inapplicable. (Peo-
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Chairman Rosenthal, Chairman Lockyer and members of the Committees:

My name is Bruce Jamison.

I am Assistant Vice President for Regulatory

Proceedings at Pacific Bell.

I am pleased to join you this afternoon to

discuss the need for reform of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
procedures.

Pacific Bell has thoroughly reviewed the two pieces of

legislation, SB 1041 and SB 1042, resulting from Senator Roberti's
investigation of complaints about CPUC processes that was initiated with
Preprint SB 8 last year.

My written testimony addresses specifically the

changes in law that would be made by the two bills Senator Roberti has
introduced this session and the problems Pacific Bell sees with these changes.

Analysis of Issues in SB 1041

1)

Change in Appellate Jurisdiction

The major change in the law that would be made by SB 1041 is the elimination
of the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court for appeal of CPUC
decisions.

This change is made in Section 4 of the bill by amending Section

1756(a) of the Pub. Util. Code to provide for review of CPUC actions by the
Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District.

The reason that has been cited previously for proposing this change is the
ever increasing workload of the Supreme Court.

Pacific firmly believes that

changing the appellate jurisdiction for Commission decisions to the Court of
Appeal would not decrease the Supreme Court's workload.

Rather, it would only

result in unnecessary delays in the implementation of Commission decisions by
adding another layer of appellate review, since it is highly likely the
majority of Appellate Court decisions would be appealed to the Supreme Court.
-2-

Intermediate review by the Court of Appeal would also significantly increase
utilities' costs.

Not only will utilitie's be financially impacted by delays

in the implementation of decisions and collection of new rates, but utilities'
costs will also be increased by the additional time it will take to bring a
case to conclusion.

2)

Right to Review of CPUC Decisions

Another change that SB 1041 makes in Section 1756(a) of the Pub. Util. Code
would provide for reyiew of CPUC decisions as a matter of right, as opposed to
the discretionary review currently exercised by the Supreme Court.

In the

corporation's review of Preprint SB 8, authored by Senator Roberti last year,
Pacific Bell opposed the change from discretionary review to an automatic
right to review.

The reasons for this opposition are that discretionary

review discourages frivolous appeals and reinforces the finality of Commission
decisions.

More appeals, including those without merit, occur when there is an automatic
right to review.

Appeals without merit are of particular concern due to the

unnecessary expenditure of resources they require and the unfair advantage
they provide to competitors wishing to delay utility actions approved by the
Commission.

Finality is very important for decisions involving telephone

corporations because of the transitional nature of the telecommunications
industry at this time.
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3)

Expansion of the Scope of Review

Amendments to Section 1757 of the Pub. Util. Code in Section 6 of SB 1041
raise only one issue.

The added language in this code section would expand

the scope of review on appeal from the current rule limiting review to a
determination of whether the CPUC has pursued its authority to also requiring
that the appellate court determine whether any CPUC action under review is
''supported by substantial evidence in the record of the proceeding."

This

expansion would make reviews of CPUC cases much more burdensome for both the
court and the parties involved by requiring the appellate court to examine in
detail the substance of CPUC decisions.

A change in the current standard would open the door to judicial regulation
and second-guessing by the judiciary.

The fact that the CPUC is a

constitutionally created body indicates the high value that should be accorded
to the expertise of the Commission.

The courts' responsibility in reviewing

the orders of regulatory bodies, at both the state and federal level, has
always been exclusively to determine the validity of such orders.

To allow

the courts to do other than decide questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and ascertain whether there is evidence to support
the decision would subvert the judgment of the Commission.

As the appointed

experts and decision-makers on utility policy matters, the Commissioners are
in the best position to evaluate the merits of different arguments and to make
consistent policy decisions based upon their expertise.
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4)

Expansion of the Scope of Redress Available to the Courts

Amendments to Section 1758 of the Pub. Util. Code in Section 7 of SB 1041 also
raise only one issue.

The new language in this section would expand the

redress available to the courts by directing the Court of Appeal or the
Supreme Court not only to affirm or set aside a CPUC decision, but also to
"afford other relief to effectuate its judgment."

This expansion, along with

the expansion of the scope of review, would severely undercut the authority of
the Commission and even further intensify the negative impacts, discussed
above, that would be caused by the expansion of the scope of review in
Section 1757 of the Pub. Util. Code.

Pacific strongly opposes any expansion

in either the scope of review or redress that can be granted by a court
reviewing CPUC decisions.

Analysis of Issues in SB 1042

1)

Who May Bring a Complaint to the Commission

k~endments

to Section 1702 of the Pub. Util. Code in Section 1 of SB 1042

raise one issue.

Language deleted from Section 1702(a) would make a

significant change in the complaint process at the CPUC by removing the
current limitations (including the requirement that not less than 25 consumers
sign a complaint) on who may bring a complaint at the CPUC about the
reasonableness of rates.
change.

Pacific is very much opposed to this proposed

Pacific believes the requirement for 25 signatures, in particular,

has prevented the filing of many frivolous complaints.
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Utility rates are set by the Commission after lengthy proceedings.

It is

patently unfair to permit those rates to be later challenged by one individual
after the numerous hours spent by many parties to determine what is a
reasonable rate.

Rates should only be permitted to be challenged when there

are new and materially changed circumstances and when the complaint is signed
by 25 or more consumers or one of the other parties now designated in
Section 1702 of the Public Utilities Code.

2)

Change in the Role of ALJs

Amendments to Section 1705 of the Pub. Util. Code in Section 3 of SB 1042
raise one issue.

Language added to Section 1705(c) would give ALJs more

authority to make decisions independently of the Commissioners.

This would be

done by requiring the Commissioners to follow the factual findings of the ALJs
and to explain their reasons for any substantive deviations from ALJs'
decisions, thus giving ALJs the same responsibility as the Commissioners for
decisions.

This change confuses the roles of the ALJs and the Commissioners,

conflicts with the constitutional authority granted to the Commissioners
(e.g., to fix rates or establish rules for public utilities), and injects
inconsistency into CPUC decisions.

Commissioners are appointed by the Governor, with the approval of the
legislature, and have ultimate responsibility for all decisions of the CPUC.
ALJs are civil servants whose role is to gather information and compile the
record upon which the Commissioners' decisions will be based.
Commissioners who must answer to the public.

It is the

To give ALJs separate

decision-making authority would essentially create two commissions, thereby
usurping the constitutional authority of the CPUC and replacing it with one
not accountable to the public.
-6-

Granting ALJs separate decision-making authority would place the Commissioners
in the position of an appellate body with regard to ALJs' decisions, contrary
to the state's constitutional provisions establishing the Commission as the
primary decision-maker with regard to the implementation of public utility
policy.

Furthermore, this dual decision-making authority raises issues of

consistency, arguing for a single point for setting regulations and making
decisions governing the range of different cases arising at the CPUC.

3)

Rules for Ex Parte Contacts

Section 4 of SB 1042 would adopt an Ex Parte Rule for the CPUC by adding
Section 1705.5 to the Pub. Util. Code.
prohibit ex parte contacts.

This new law would, to a great extent,

Specifically, the Ex Parte Rule proposed by this

legislation does the following:

(1) Commissioners would be prohibited from communicating orally or in
writing with any "party" or ALJ in a pending "adjudicatory
proceeding."

Commissioners would be permitted to confer with the ALJ

after a proposed decision has been issued.

(See Section 1705.5(a)(1).)

(2) If a prohibited communication occurs, the Commissioner would be
required to file a notice of the communication and a summary of any
oral communication or a copy of any written communication.

An

opportunity for rebuttal on the record would also have to be
provided.

(See Section 1705.S(a)(2).)

(3) Communication with an Advisor to a Commissioner or any member of the
Commission staff would be very limited since communication with these
parties is prohibited to the extent it would circumvent the purpose of
the Ex Parte Rule.

(See Section 1705.S(a)(3).)
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(4) Parties to an adjudicatory proceeding would be prohibited from
communicating with the ALJ "except upon notice to all parties
providing an opportunity to be heard."

Upon receipt of such

communication the ALJ would be required to file a notice of the
communication and determine whether sanctions should be imposed.

A

party who violates this requirement may be required to show why their
claim should not be "dismissed, denied, disregarded or otherwise
adversely affected."

(See Section 1705.5(b).)

The draconian measures that would be imposed by this legislation would
severely hinder the ability of the CPUC to function as a regulatory body.
Good regulation of an industry is dependent on the free flow of information
between the regulators and the regulated entities.

The Ex Parte Rule proposed

by SB 1042 emphasizes the prohibition of communications.

A rule that instead

emphasized disclosure and the obligation to rer.ort ex parte contacts on the
record would be much more valuable and supportive of the regulatory process.

Regulatory bodies like the CPUC perform quasi-legislative as well as
quasi-judicial functions.

Almost all cases before the CPUC are in some way

legislative in nature, that is, they involve public policy issues.

It is

imperative that the CPUC's "constituency" be permitted to communicate with it
for the Commission to be made aware of all the areas of concern and range of
proposed solutions available.

Pacific Bell believes the constraints on

communication that would be imposed by the Ex Parte Rule in SB 1042 are so
restrictive they would prevent the Commission from rendering decisions that
are in the best interest of the public it serves.
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An Ex Parte Rule should be simple, effective and as non-burdensome as possible
for those subject to it.
and confusing.

The rule set out in this legislation is ambiguous

There is no definition of who is a party.

The definition of

what constitutes an adjudicatory proceeding is very broad and vague.

It is

unclear in the section prohibiting parties from communicating with ALJs,
Section 1705.5(b), exactly what is allowed and when sanctions will be imposed.

The CPUC has recently determined (3/22/91) that it is time to revisit the
question of adopting a generic rule governing ex parte contacts in Commission
proceedings.

Comments on the Ex Parte Rule proposed by the Commission are due

April 22, 1991.

The Commission has gained some experience with ex parte rules

that it has adopted on a case-by-case basis.

The Commission is in the best

position, based on this experience and that of the parties who will comment in
the Commission's proceeding, to determine the kind of Ex Parte Rule that will
facilitate its decision-making process while maintaining the due process and
fair access that are necessary for all parties appearing before it.

Thank you for considering the concerns about the changes that SB 1041 and
SB 1042 would make in the CPUC's regulatory processes that I have identified.
Pacific Bell looks forward to working with the legislature to assure any
procedural reforms at the CPUC are fair to all parties involved.
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Bay Area Teleport very much appreciates this opportunity to discuss our views on the
subject of process and procedure at the California Public Utilities Commission. We strongly
support the fundamental due process concepts addressed by SB 1041 and SB 1042: access
to justice provided by appellate judicial review, effective controls on ex parte contacts with
the Commissioners and staff, and more definite rules applicable to the conduct of
proceedings by the CPUC's Administrative Law Judges.

Bay Area Teleport· Who We Are

Bay Area Teleport ("BAT'} is an Alameda-based telecommunications common
carrier, providing high quality, high speed digital voice and data services via dedicated
circuits, to long distance interexchange carriers and to business and governmental users.
Our network serves locations in eleven Northern California counties, including the cities of
San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, Sacramento, Santa Rosa, Santa Cruz, and surrounding
communities. BAT was founded in 1984 and began offering service in 1986.
BAT is an entrepreneurial venture, and our network was constructed and operates
entirely on private capital. Our operations are regulated by both the California Public
Utilities Commission and the Federal Communications Commission.
Since our inception, we have been a frequent participant in telecommunications
matters which come before the CPUC, for two reasons. First, BAT considers its chief
competitor to be Pacific Bell. Since Pacific Bell is regulated by the CPUC, BAT must
appear before the CPUC to argue for rules, regulations, and results that control Pacific
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Bell's ability and incentive to use its monopoly and market power in an anticompetitive
fashion against BAT. Second, we are a ratepaying customer of Pacific Bell. BAT must
involve itself at the CPUC to attempt to ensure that we are charged fair rates for the
monopoly services we must purchase from Pacific Bell.

The CPUC's Processes and Procedures

As many public policy makers are aware, the CPUC is in the midst of a significant

restructuring of its regulatory oversight of telecommunications utilities under its jurisdiction.
The CPUC has been quite cautious in allowing the benefits of increased competition to be
realized by California telecommunications consumers, and has proceeded at a slower pace
than have other major states. Meanwhile, technological change and innovation have
proceeded rapidly, and have brought competition, although in a de facto manner in some
cases, for some services in California.
As competition begins and spreads, the CPUC's regulatory role changes by necessity.

When the provision of telecommunications services was a 100% monopoly enterprise by
Pacific Bell, GTE California, and the other Local Exchange Carriers ("LECs") in California,
the CPUC's primary role was the protection of monopoly ratepayers from monopoly abuses,
such as overcharges and undue rate discrimination. With the entry of competitors, all of
whom are both competitors and customers of the LECs, the CPUC must oversee more
players, must watch for and prevent any anticompetitive activities of the LECs, and must
also allow the LECs to compete fairly.
There are, of course, a number of different regulatory models available, based on the
experiences of numerous other states who have turned the trail the CPUC now walks into
a well-worn path. The Commission has chosen to modify its telecommunications regulatory
regime in a number of important aspects, most of which have been implemented in a longrunning docket entitled Investigation 87-11-033.
In Phase I of this docket, the Commission allowed competition for a handful of
services previously reserved to Pacific Bell and the other LECs, and granted the LECs
pricing flexibility for those services. In Phase II, the Commission acceded to the wishes of
Pacific Bell and GTE California, and substantially changed its regulatory approach for those
companies in the fall of 1989. The principal outcome of Phase II was the adoption of a new
pricing structure for LEC telecommunications services, with an emphasis on so-called "price
caps" and ranges of rates, and a departure from hearing-based rate-setting in the traditional
rate case context.
From BATs perspective, the Commission has incorrectly presumed that the
emergence of some competition for Pacific Bell and the other LECs should be the occasion
not only for the abandonment of effective regulatory controls over the LECs, in the name
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of "freeing" the LECs to "compete", but also for the abandonment of the due process rights
of interested parties before the CPUC. The Commission is departing from traditional
processes, in which the fundamental decisions involving rates, service, and competition are
made based on evidence established and tested in the hearing room. As it emphasizes more
informal methods of policy making, such as "rulemakings", off-the-record ''workshops", and
advice letters, the Commission has, both practically speaking and as a matter of stated
policy, de-emphasized the discipline which accompanies the hearing room: the fairness and
regularity of procedure, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses under oath, and the
creation of a full and complete evidentiary record.
Moreover, as it departs from traditional decision making, it appears the Commission
has adopted a new method of making policy and resolving disputes: prejudgment. Our
experience, and we believe the experience of most of the companies attempting to make a
go of it in the telecommunications marketplace in California, has been that no amount of
facts or evidence presented before an Administrative Law Judge will alter the Commission's
predetermined course. Traditional hearing processes are not gradually being left behind,
they are being abandoned so rapidly as to be considered a waste of time by those making
the Commission's ultimate decisions. Exacerbating this problem is the appearance that such
predetermined outcomes are arrived at as the direct result of ex parte contacts and
information provided off-the-record by ratepayer-supported lobbyists of large utility
companies.

The I. 87-11-633 Phase HI Experience

We raise I. 87-11-033 because the Commission's conduct of Phase III of that docket
provides a telling object lesson on the need for statutory reform of the Public Utilities Code.
Phase III was established to deal with issues of fundamental importance: the nature,
pace, and scope of competition for LEC services which the Commission would allow; the
rules applicable to that competition; the responsive rate changes by LECs which the
Commission would allow; and the impact of the Commission's decisions on ratepayers at all
levels. It is difficult to imagine a more important set of decisions for the Commission to
make in the field of contemporary telecommunications regulation. Moreover, these
decisions clearly require the development of the best possible record to serve as the basis
for decision, since many of the necessary decisions are one-time in nature. Unfortunately,
the Commission attempted ill-advised procedural shortcuts, as the following discussion
demonstrates. We believe the events of the last year illustrate dramatically the flaws of the
CPUC's current procedures and the need for intervention by the Legislature.
In November, 1989, the Assigned Commissioner issued a Ruling that announced a
new procedural approach for Phase III of I. 87-11-033. "[W]e will use a variety of
procedural means to build the Phase III record," he stated.
"We will rely on
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notice-and-comment rulemaking to determine policy issues where appropriate. We will hold
hearings as appropriate on questions of fact where the
differ. Workshops may be
used to resolve questions that follow narrowly
or even
the
Commission may adopt..." This Ruling also identified specific
to be addressed in what
was referred to as "Prepared Testimony."
A number of parties, including Pacific Bell, GTE California and the Commission
staff, filed opening and reply testimony on the specified issues in January and February,
1990. Because BATs prior experience in Phases I and IT had shown that the cost of
retaining an expert witness to prepare such testimony would range from $70,000 to $100,000,
BAT decided to wait for the promised Phase Ill hearings, where it expected it would be able
to cross-examine witnesses, submit briefs, and file comments on the Proposed Decision,
focusing only on the points where its interests were affected or where it could make a direct
contribution. Like other parties, BAT waited for the scheduling of a pre hearing conference
to identify hearing dates. No such conference was scheduled, and rumors began to multiply
that the Commission was going to try to dispense with hearings altogether. (Ironically, the
Commission had conducted Phase II pursuant to its longstanding practice of
evidentiary
hearings and briefs). BAT became concerned that it would have no opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses under oath or otherwise intervene in a meaningful
In July, 1990, the assigned Administrative Law
issued a proposed decision.
BAT strenuously objected to the denial of due process inherent in the attempt to dispense
with hearings. Pointing to the Assigned Commissioner's Ruling, BAT stated that it had
relied on the statement that hearings would
held on questions of disputed fact; not only
did BAT show that there were numerous areas with disputed factual claims, but BAT also
demonstrated that hearings were legally required under Section 1708 of the Public Utilities
Code because the proposed decision would alter several important prior Commission
decisions. Despite strong pressures to the contrary from certain other parties, BAT held fast
to its position that hearings were legally required. TURN joined BAT
that effort.
a Phase III
Ultimately, however, the Commission agreed with BAT and chose not to
decision.
BAT is proud of the role that it played in confronting, and
what many
parties believed was a fait accompli. namely, the issuance of a Phase III decision without
the benefit of evidentiary hearings. Looking back on the matter, BAT believes the
Commission was saved from issuing a decision with numerous factual
worse, significant
policy errors that, belatedly, even Pacific and GTE California recognized would
brought major adverse consequences for their companies.
Largely in response to BATs intervention, the
proposed
further comment on
decision as a new "Proposed Decision" and asked the parties
whether hearings were required to resolve disputed facts. After receipt of extensive
comments from BAT and other parties, the Commission then scheduled the pre hearing
conference that, under its usual custom and practice, should have
a year before.
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With no small amount of effort, the originally sprawling set of issues was pared down to a
manageable scope, new testimony was filed, and 16 days of hearings were finally held.
Those hearings were recently completed, and briefs are due in the near future. Matters that
the Commission may have believed were capable
easy resolution are now seen as
considerably more complex and stubborn. BAT submits that evidence, not ex parte contacts,
is what brought that recognition about.

Why We Support SB 1041 and SB 1042

BAT is convinced that whatever delay occurred between late 1989 and early 1991 was
caused almost entirely by the Commission's attempt to dispense with due process and with
its customary, tried-and-true hearing procedures that permit cross-examination of witnesses
under oath. Rather than hastening decision, the attempt to avoid hearings caused many
parties, including BAT, to believe that the Commission, in effect, intended to act on the
basis of information received outside the hearing room from only those parties with
sufficient influence to make their voices heard and their wishes known, and without the
benefit of information from other parties. In other words, what was generated was a distrust
of the Commission's process; this distrust was finally alleviated only when the Commission
acknowledged that hearings were not only legally required, but also the best means for
resolving the complex factual and policy issues awaiting decision.
Realizing that it was forced to do so regardless of the financial burden, BAT fully
participated in the Phase III hearings once they were finally held, including actively
cross-examining other parties' witnesses. Having done so, and having gone to such
extraordinary lengths to force the Commission to held hearings in Phase III in accordance
with the promise in the Assigned Commissioner's Ruling, BAT believes more strongly than
ever that the Phase III decision should now be made only on the basis of substantial
evidence in the record, not on the basis of ex parte contacts, and that meaningful judicial
review should be available in case the Commission makes an error of law or abuses its
discretion in determining matters of fact.
Typically, ex parte contacts involve representations made at the last minute on
matters that were never even addressed in the hearing room. Typically they are made by
persons who have no knowledge of, or interest in, what happened in the hearing room.
Typically the information is inaccurate or, if not inaccurate, subtly biased in favor of the
fortunate party that has gained the decisionmaker's attention. Not only are other parties
prevented from rebutting (or even learning about) such information, but worse, the
Commission may reach a decision on the basis of factors antithetical to the welfare of the
state as a whole.
Moreover, limits on ex parte contacts go hand-in-hand with meaningful judicial
reVIew. Meaningful judicial review helps insure that a Commission decision will be reached
-5-

on the basis of substantial evidence in the record. Having a court with time to review the
record increases the chances that a decision will be made in the first instance on the basis
of a fair and impartial assessment of all. the evidence in the record, not simply the evidence
argued in ex parte contacts. BATs experience in I. 87-11-033 and, in particular, in Phase
ill thereof, convinces BAT that these are necessary regulatory reforms, and that they should
be made part of the Public Utilities Code so that other parties will not be forced in the
future, as BAT was, to undertake such extensive efforts simply to insure that a hearing is
held.
A long list of parties will, by the time this legislative hearing is concluded, bring to
the Committee's attention the current realities of the CPUC judicial appeal process: for all
intents and purposes, this process is almost nonexistent. The first line of appeal -- to the
Commission itself for a reversal of a previous decision -- is seldom effective. The next, and
~other line of appeal is to the California Supreme Court, via a writ of review process.
The Committee is no doubt well aware that California is the only major state which does
not provide for judicial review as a matter of right of its utilities commission's decisions.
This, combined with the crush of death penalty and criminal appeals before the Supreme
Court, has created an appeal "gridlock" which denies any meaningful review to disaffected
or injured parties as the result of CPUC decisions.
Thus, the environment within the Commission, wherein procedures and rules are
essentially being written as the agency goes along (and often to support predetermined
outcomes), is not merely allowed to exist because of an absence of any real oversight-- it
is encouraged. The CPUC is free to act as it chooses with the full knowledge that aggrieved
parties have no judicial body available to them to ask for a review of factual or evidentiary
integrity of Commission decisions, and no meaningful review of conformity to statutory or
Constitutional law as a deterrent against future unfair action.
For the past five years, BAT has joined with other competitive companies, the
California Manufacturers Association, the California Judicial Council, and a diverse
grouping of interests in seeking to introduce a measure of meaningful judicial review into
the decision making of the CPUC. We supported AB 4237 (Hauser) in 1987, and AB 338
(Floyd) in 1989. Since 1989, we have sought to build support for the introduction of a new
appellate review bill by contacting dozens of companies, associations, and agencies who
believe, as we do, that the CPUC was becoming increasingly unaccountable for increasingly
questionable decision making. They believe, as we do, that CPUC decisions are simply too
important and costly to be made without appropriate judicial review when necessary.
Our concerns also led us to support Senator Rosenthal's attempt last year to
introduce a fair reporting mechanism for off-the-record contacts at the CPUC, SB 1125.
BAT believes that access to decision-makers at all levels of the Commission can be a useful
way of communicating general information. However, we feel it is equally important that
a record of such exchanges be kept. In this way, all concerned parties can know at least
which decision makers have been contacted and when.
-6-

We also strongly support the provision of SB 1042 which requires the CPUC to make
its decisions based on the record of proceedings of a particular case. We attempted to
amend AB 338 with a similar provision two years ago.

Conclusion

Bay Area Teleport has rarely believed it appropriate for the Legislature to involve
itself in determining specific outcomes of CPUC decision making. We do believe that
individuals can make mistakes and that the process for arriving at certain outcomes can be
flawed. Ultimately, this is why we believe there is a compelling need for SB 1041 and SB
1042. We know of no reason why the CPUC should be alone among state agencies (and
indeed alone among major states' public utilities commissions) in avoiding judicial review.
Likewise, we believe it is time the Legislature took a hard look at the role of off-the-record
discussions in Commission decisions. The Commission, unlike the Legislature, does not face
the threat of electoral scrutiny. It should be compelled to base its decisions on record facts
and evidence.
We respectfully urge passage of SB 1041 and SB 1042, and stand ready to assist the
Members and their staffs as they consider any modifications which may be appropriate to
these long-overdue pieces of legislation.
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April 8, 1991
Senator David Roberti
President Pro Tempore
State of California Senate
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Senator Roberti:
Thank you for your letter of March 26, 1991 regarding Senate
Bills 1041 and 1042.
This office represents the Western Burglar & Fire Alarm
Association which is a trade association of security companies
doing business in the State of California. They are large users
of telecommunications services and have been interested parties
in telephone company proceedings dating back to the 1960's. The
Western Burglar & Fire Alarm Association supports both of your
proposed bills.
The limitation of judicial review of Public Utility
Commission decisions to the California supreme Court has created
a de facto immunity for the Commission from judicial review.
Over its history, the Supreme Court has reviewed very few Public
Utility Commission cases and it is quite appropriate to amend the
review process to permit easier access to a judicial forum. This
is particularly relevant in light of the fact that in recent
proceedings the Commission has attempted to or in fact has
dispensed with evidentiary hearings before making decisions on
key issues. This occurred in the alternative regulatory
framework proceedings (1.87-11-033) and the Commission's review
into the cellular radiotelephone utilities (!.88-11-040).
The WBFAA also supports Senate Bill 1042. The interested
parties do not enjoy the same access to the Commissioners and
their staff as are enjoyed by the utilities. Therefore,
unrestricted ex parte contacts have generally worked to the
disservice and disfavor of interested parties and consumers in
general. However, there is a modification that should be made to
SB 1042 with regard to notice.

GOLD, MARKS, RING, & PEPPER

Senator David Roberti
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Page 2

It would be appropriate to amend Sections 1705.5(a) (2) and
1705.5(b) to provide that a copy of the notice and description of
the communication be served on all parties of record rather than
merely being placed in the public file.
If it is only placed in
the public file, it is unlikely that the interested parties will
become aware of the communication in a timely manner.
We appreciate your concern regarding these important issues,
and if we may be of further service or assistance, please do not
hesitate to contact us.
Yours truly,
GOLD, MARKS, RING & PEPPER

By------::-::~---=---=l~,
_Q~_,.__,._--=-Alan L. Pepper
ALP:clr
cc: Roger Westphal, President,
Western Burglar & Fire Alarm Assn.
Senator Bill Lockyer, Chairman,
Senate Judiciary Committee
/senator Herschel Rosenthal, Chairman,
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
52970\054\ALP04081.let
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Corporation
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20 1 Spear Street
N1nth Floor
San Franc1sco. CA 94105
-115 978 1208

Ann Gressan1
Government Relat1ons
Pac:f1c OIVI«Ion

April 8, 1991
Senator David Roberti
Senate President ProTem
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
Re:

SB 1041 -- SUPPORT
Hearing April 9th, Joint Meeting of Senate Committees on
Judiciary and Energy & Public Utilities

Dear Senator Roberti:
MCI strongly supports SB 1041, which will provide parties in
proceedings before the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) the right to
appeal PUC decisions to the Court of Appeal. This measure would
provide a realistic opportunity for relief under a regulatory system
increasingly characterized by a lack of due process resulting from the
informal and ad hoc decision making employed by the PUC as it attempts
to move away from traditional regulation. In addition to being afforded
the opportunity to appeal unjust decisions, MCI believes that the increased
possibility of judicial review proposed by this bill would serve to encourage
the PUC to more scrupulously enforce due process procedures as part of
its decision making, and lead to a more fair and equitable regulatory
process.
Decisions of the PUC have imposed upon MCI new and
unreasonable requirements which were never the subject of evidentiary
proceedings, or subject to challenge through cross-examination or other
processes. Furthermore, our efforts to demand due process have been
circumvented by the Commission's apparent ability to ignore altogether
legitimate protests. In order to strengthen SB 1041, the bill should be
amended to address a new informal method of decision-making at the PUC
which leaves MCI and other parties with regulatory "decisions" that are
never even put into writing, which render us unable even to use the
appellate process intended to be provided by your bill.

Senator Roberti
4/8/91
Page 2

For example, a utility may request an expedited rate change through
the device of an "advice letter" filing to the PUC. This procedure delegates
almost all decision-making responsibility to PUC staff, rather than to
appointed officials. Although time is allowed for parties with concerns to
file protests against the proposed change, the PUC staff may choose to
ignore the protests completely and allow the rate change automatically to
go into effect without even issuing an ord~r that addresses and adequately
responds to the concerns of the protesting parties. The protesting party
has no way of knowing whether the Commissioners themselves were even
aware that a protest had been filed. Furthermore, the rate change goes
into effect without the creation of an appealable PUC decision establishing
the legal or factual basis for ignoring the legal challenges contained in the
protests.
Therefore, we suggest including the following amendment which
would simply require the PUC to either grant or deny properly-filed
protests and complaints, by issuing an order that adequately responds to
any legitimate issues that have been raised. Such an amendment would
assure that the Commissioners are aware of the protest and provide
interested parties with a full explanation of the basis for the PUC's
decision. If concerns still remain, this written decision will enable parties
to seek judicial review of the Commission's action, and enable the Court to
comprehend the nature of the dispute and rationale by which the
commission reached its decision, thereby facilitating the appellate review
process.
Proposed Amendment
Add third paragraph to existing Public Utilities Code Section 728:
If a customer or competitor of a utility or other interested
person files a timely-filed protest or complaint, alleging that the
rates or classifications that any utility demands, deserves, charges or
collects, or proposes to demand, deserve, charge or collect, for or in
connection with any service, product or commodity, or that the
existing or proposed rules, practices or contracts affecting such rates
or classifications are insufficient, unlawful, unjust, unreasonable,
discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall, in a timely
manner, issue an order that either grants, in whole or in part, the
protest or complaint, or denies, in whole or in part, the protest or

Senator Roberti
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complaint, and which sets forth the reasons for the Commission's
decision, including the factual and legal bases upon which it
disposed of the protest or complaint.
MCI greatly appreciates your interest in addressing the important
issues of PUC regulation, issues with a profound economic impact on
consumers and businesses in California. We are eager to work closely with
you and your staff to help this important proposal become law.
Sincerely,

~~~W'·
Ann Gressani

Manager, Government Relations
cc:

Senator Herschel Rosenthal
Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities
Senator Bill Lockyer
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee

April 9, 1991
JOINT INFORMATIONAL HEARING
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITfEE
AND
SENATE ENERGY AND PUBUC UTIUTIES COMMITfEE
REFORM OF PUBUC UTIUTIES COMMISSION PROCEDURES
SB 1041 AND SB 1042, ROBERTI

My name is Daniel Baker, and I am counsel for the Ad Hoc Carriers
Committee which is an association of small and medium size PUC regulated
motor carriers. Its primary function is to participate in PUC general freight
investigations proceedings, to assist in the development of an adequate
record upon which the Commission can base a rational and proper decision.
In the past two general freight investigation proceedings, the Ad Hoc
Carriers provided more expert witnesses than any other participant. The
basic regulatory program adopted by the Commission in its 1986 Decision
was proposed by the Ad Hoc Carriers.
I have practiced before the Commission and the California Supreme
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Court for over 30 years. I have testified before the Judiciary Committee of
the Senate on behalf of the State Bar on the same issue, an appeal from
PUC decisions, about 20 years ago. The argument was the same - there is
no actual appeal to the state Supreme Court from capricious, arbitrary, and
even unlawful Commission decisions. The PUC under the present system is
accountable to no one.
The recent Commission general freight decision issued February 1990,
is a clear example of what is wrong with this appeal system. The most
important element of the rate regulatory program adopted by that decision,
a variable cost price floor or a minimum rate floor, was not introduced in
the case until eight months after the proceeding record was closed. An
obvious violation of due process. PUC Code 1705 requires findings of fact
and conclusions of law to be based upon the case record for all material
issues.

There could be no findings or conclusions based upon the case

record for the variable cost price floor for the matter was not introduced,
argued, or considered in the proceeding. Section 491 of the Code requires
that all common carrier rates and tariffs to be filed on 30 days notice to the
Commission and the public. The Commission by its decision reduced the

2

statutory notice to 10 days.

Section 3662 states that the PUC "shall"

establish or approve rates for permitted carriers. By its decision, the PUC
changed the word "shall'' to "shall not" establish or approve rates for these
earners.

There are additional findings and conclusions in the decision

equally repugnant to fairness and the law of this state, but I believe the few
mentioned clearly demonstrate the problem that exists.
Three petitions for writs of review were filed with the state Supreme
Court asking for an appeal of the February, 1990 decision, all of which were
denied. The Ad Hoc Carriers petition received the most votes to grant an
appeal, however, it obtained only three of the four votes that were required
and "close is only good in horse races."
Another deficiency in the present system is that "reconsideration" by
the Supreme Court of a denial of a petition for a writ of review is not
permitted.

However, such a right is available from all other state and

federal courts including the U.S. Supreme Court.
The California system with regard to appeals from PUC decisions is
defective, unfair, and practically nonexistent. A change in these appellate
procedures is long overdue.

3

With respect to SB 1402, the 1990 California PUC in the recent past
regulated through ex parte communications and by a marketplace
philosophy. The investigation which resulted in the 1990 general freight
regulatory program involved 58 days of oral hearings but the decision is
almost bare of any discussion of the factual evidence introduced. Generally,
it was a waste of time and effort by the over 100 witnesses and literally
thousands of participants which appeared in the case directly or through
their associations. Ex parte communication is not for the little people which
are disadvantaged from this unfair and improper practice.

And the

marketplace philosophy and policies are not designed to protect the vast
majority of the people of this state which the PUC was created to protect.
Ask the question why these ex parte communications cannot be offered
1n the formal oral hearings which are held for the specific purpose of
gathering pertinent information. At these hearings the information to be
offered is submitted under oath and its creditability and reliability is tested
through cross-examination.

The Commissioners of the PUC are not

competent to test or challenge the ex parte statements.

None of the

Commissioners have been employed by or associated with utilities they

4

control nor a shipper or a earner.

Hearings are conducted to protect

Commissioners against prejudiced, distorted, incredible, and/or untrue
statements. Receiving and encouraging ex parte back-door communications
bypasses the safeguards established for the Commissioners and for the
protection of the people of this state.
The ex parte communication should not be tolerated and should be
declared unlawful. The decisionmakers of our courts are forbidden by law
from receiving ex parte communications. PUC's Commissioners' decisions on
important issues are of far greater significance and consequence than an
order of any judge and ex parte communication should be subjected to the
same restraints.

5
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Earl Nicholas Selby

BY FACSIMILE
April 9, 1991

Hon. David Roberti
President Pro Tempore
California Senate
California Legislature
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 94248

Hon. Herschel Rosenthal
Chairman
Senate Committee on Energy
and Public Utilities
California Legislature
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 94248
Dear Senator Roberti and Senator Rosenthal:

Please be so kind as to add this letter to the hearing record in support of enactment of
Senate Bill 1041 and Senate Billl042. I understand that these bills will be the _subject of a joint
informational hearing on April 9 before the Senate Energy and Public Utilities Committee and
the Senate Judiciary Committee. I urge the Committees to approve these bills for consideration
by the full Senate..
SB 1041 would accomplish two important reforms in judicial review of decisions made
by the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC" or "Commission"). First, it provides
for direct review of Commission decisions by the Court of Appeal rather than the California
Supreme Court. Second, it would authorize the Court of Appeal to review whether Commission
decisions are supported by substantial evidence in the Commission's record (and not simply
whether the Commission has regularly pursued its authority). These refonns are long overdue.
This bill would result in meaningful judicial review of CPUC decisions for the first time in a
long time. The current workload of the California Supreme Court effectively precludes judicial
review. The Supreme Court's workload is so heavily burdened with death penalty cases and
other criminal matters that the Court appears to be strongly disinclined to grant review of
CPUC decisions. as evidenced by the relative handful of CPUC decisions actually accepted for
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review by the Court in the last seven years. Indeed, except when a decision involves a matter
of general law outside the CPUC's specific jurisdiction, the Court almost never reviews the
Commission's decisions. This situation has left the Commission virtually a law onto itself, with
little real oversight. Such a situation should not be allowed to continue. I do not believe that
there is any regulatory commission in the United States that enjoys as much unreviewable
discretion as the CPUC; given the enormous influence that the CPUC has on both the state and
national economies, it is vital that it be subjected to meaningful judicial review.

SB 1042 would effect an equally important reform in the Commission's procedures.
Principally, it would enact a ban on ex ~ contacts with CPUC Commissioners in any
uadjudicatory proceeding" pending before the CPUC concerning any issue of law or fact
involved in the proceeding. This refonn also is long overdue. Unfortunately, to an extent that
the public and perhaps even the Legislature scarcely imagines, much of the CPUC's current
business is heavily influenced by~ n..arte contact. I regret having felt obliged, on behalf of my
clients, to engage in such contact, and I would like to see the whole system ended. The result
of such contacts is not only a loss of confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the
Commission's decision-making processes, but also, in the long run, a loss of quality in the
CPUC's decisions as well. Typically,~ parte presentations involve information that was not
tested in the hearing room; such information is either wholly in~urate or biased or both, and
should never be the basis for decision. Yet, when other parties are unable to rebut (and, worse,
often do not even know about) such presentations, g parte information frequently does become
part of the ground for decision. Again, this situation should not be allowed to continue.
I believe I am well positioned to offer these observations. First, I served as a research

attorney for the California Supreme Court in 1978 and 1979, so that I have more than a passing
acquaintance with some of the pressures on that Court's caseload. Second, after leaving the
Court, I joined the Commission's Legal Division and then served as the Legal Advisor to (the
late) Commissioner (later Judge) Richard D. Gravelle between 1980 and 1982. In that position,
I frequently attended meetings involving ~ parte presentations; thus, I have had the opportunity
to know and understand quite intimately the advantages and disadvantages of such contacts.
Finally, since 1983, I have frequently appeared before the Commission as an attorney in private
practice on behalf of numerous clients. As stated above, at times I have felt obliged to make
~parte presentations myself, and I have always personally regretted their necessity. Suffice
it to say, I am quite familiar with both the Commission's processes and its decisions over a time
period extending more than 10 years. After long thought on the subject, I have come to the
point where I strongly support the reforms proposed in SB 1041 and 1042. I urge the Legisla~
ture to. pass these bills.
I believe that SB 1041 and SB 1042 represent an historic opportunity for the legislature
to ensure that the Commission remains faithful to the purposes for which it was established
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almost 80 years ago, namely, to protect all Californians from. the power and influence of large
economic interests providing monopoly services essential to their welfare. If these reforms are
not adopted, the Commission will likely conclude that the future should involve less, rather than
more, due process and lesst rather than more, opportunity for the voices of ordinary Californians to be heard. Please let me know if there is anything that I can do to assist in seeing these
bills enacted.
Very truly yours,
,
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Earl Nicholas Selby
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